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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
We live in paradoxical times. The core institutions and systems that have supported 
journalism in America for decades are weathering a perfect storm of challenges that have 
undercut our country’s longstanding information infrastructure. At the same time, a 
new generation of news and journalism organizations are driving a renaissance in local 
reporting and reinvigorating our media system. This shifting media landscape has inspired 
a range of important reports and initiatives designed to help chart a course toward stronger 
journalism and media in America. 
A diverse set of stakeholders – policymakers, academics, foundations, nonprofits, and 
former and current journalists – have weighed what the future of journalism might 
look like and what it might take to get there. In report after report, America’s public and 
noncommercial media sector has been held up as a core component to the future of hard-
hitting, accountability journalism. All of the major reports released in 2009 and 2010 
agreed that there is a vital role for public and noncommercial media to play, and that the 
federal government must work to strengthen and expand funding for it.1 Together, these 
reports sparked inquiries at both the Federal Communications Commission and the 
Federal Trade Commission. 
However, too often the moderate proposals for federal funding and public media run into 
a wave of protest and knee-jerk reactions against any and all government action. In fact, 
government has always and will always influence how our media system functions, from 
the early newspaper postal subsidies to handing out broadcast licenses and subsidizing 
broadband deployment. The question is not if government should be involved, but how, 
and that is a question that demands an in-depth conversation, not a shouting match.  
Those concerned about government involvement in journalism have legitimate concerns 
about the ways federal funding can open the door to undue political pressure. While there 
is broad agreement that the current situation in American journalism is a classic case of 
market failure, remedial action has been stymied by the fear that any public policy cure 
would be worse than the disease. The proper response to these concerns, however, should 
1  See Leonard Downie, Jr. and Michael Schudson, “The Reconstruction of American Journalism,” Columbia Journal-
ism Review, published online October 19, 2009. This report was endorsed in a CJR editorial, “A Helping Hand: The 
case for (smart) government support of journalism,” Columbia Journalism Review (November / December 2009). For 
other positive evaluations of targeted government support of U.S. journalism, see Geneva Overholser and Geoffrey 
Cowan, “Free press, with profits,” Los Angeles Times, January 19, 2009; Bree Nordenson, “The Uncle Sam Solution,” 
Columbia Journalism Review (September/October 2007); Victor Pickard, Josh Stearns, and Craig Aaron, “Saving the 
News: Toward a National Journalism Strategy,” Free Press Policy Report, Washington, D.C., 2009; The Knight Commis-
sion on the Information Needs of Communities in a Democracy, “Informing Communities: Sustaining Democracy in 
the Digital Age,” The Aspen Institute, 2009; and David Westphal and Geoffrey Cowan, “Public Policy and Funding the 
News,” USC Annenberg School of Communications and Journalism, 2010.
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be to identify how best to insulate journalists and newsrooms from political pressure, not 
to throw the baby out with the bathwater.
Although U.S. public broadcasting has accomplished much in the 40 years since its 
founding, today there is a growing sense that we can and must do better. In the global 
context, our public media system’s independent civic mission is woefully underfunded: 
U.S. per capita public spending is less than $4, far less than the $30 to $134 per capita 
for the 14 countries examined in this study. And as the recent efforts by politicians to 
punish NPR for its firing of Juan Williams suggest, public media in America possess little 
autonomy from direct political pressure. How can public media be adequately funded and 
adequately protected from partisan political meddling? These decisions do not need to be 
made in a vacuum. The lessons of other democratic nations, many of whose public media 
systems have been around long before American public broadcasting, are instructive.
In this report, we survey the concrete ways that a cross-section of democratic nation-
states around the world fund and protect the autonomy of public media. Countries 
examined in this report are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. Most of our focus will be on television and radio public service broadcasters, 
increasingly reaching citizens via online platforms, though where appropriate we will also 
document public support for newspapers (in Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands, 
Norway and Sweden). 
In the 14 nations examined in this study, public media independence and democratic 
functioning are promoted through a variety of means. 
•	 First,	in	several	countries,	funding	is	established	for	multiyear	periods,	thus	
lessening	the	capacity	of	the	government	to	directly	link	funding	to	either	approval	
or	disapproval	of	programming.			
•	 Second,	public	media	seem	to	be	strongest	when	citizens	feel	that	media	are	
responsive	to	them	rather	than	to	politicians	or	advertisers	(i.e.,	when	they	are	truly	
“public”).	Funding	structures	and	oversight	organizations	that	create	a	direct	link	
between	public	media	and	their	audiences	foster	citizen	engagement,	involvement	
and	accountability.
•	 Third,	the	legal	and	administrative	charters	establishing	public	broadcasters	work	
to	assure	that	public	funds	are	spent	in	the	public	interest	—	providing	diverse,	
high-quality	news	and	other	content.	At	the	same	time,	these	charters	and	related	
media	laws	restrict	the	capacity	of	governments	to	exert	influence	over	content	in	a	
partisan	direction.	
•	 Fourth,	public	agencies,	administrative	boards,	and/or	trusts	of	one	type	or	
another	exist	in	all	countries	to	serve	as	a	buffer	between	the	broadcasters	and	the	
government	in	power.	The	independence	of	such	agencies,	boards,	and	trusts	is	
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bolstered	through	a	variety	of	means	and	by	creating	an	“arms-length”	institutional	
relationship	between	the	public	broadcaster	and	partisan	political	interference	or	
meddling.	
As a result of these policies, not only have public broadcasters continued to provide 
high-quality, diverse programming, they have also been responsible for airing critical 
investigations of government performance. According to a growing body of scholarly 
research, public broadcasters  across western Europe and other democracies examined 
in this study provide more and higher quality public affairs programming and a greater 
diversity of genres and unique perspectives than their commercial counterparts. Publicly 
subsidized newspapers are just as or more critical of government than their advertising-
subsidized competitors.  
Today, democratic public media systems in Europe, North America and elsewhere face 
challenges on a number of fronts. European scholars and journalists we consulted 
for this study emphasized the threat to public broadcasters posed by increasing 
commercial pressures, and, in general, the increasing difficulty of balancing demands 
to simultaneously appeal to large audiences and to uphold public service values such as 
high-quality programming across multiple genres, in-depth information, promotion of 
democratic citizenship, and representation of diverse voices and viewpoints.  
Some public broadcasters are better funded and operated than others. Our survey 
highlights the notable strengths of public media systems in the U.K., Germany and 
Scandinavian countries. In contrast, due to erosion in either the amount of funding or 
procedures for assuring arms-length autonomy from direct governmental control, public 
media have arguably been weakened in recent years in Australia, Canada, France, The 
Netherlands and New Zealand.  
Likewise, in the transition to digital and Internet platforms, countries with public service 
broadcasting are adopting a variety of approaches to maintain or increase public funding, 
some more conducive than others to maintaining an important role for public service 
media. While advertising or online merchandising might seem to offer an additional 
means of funding online expansion, public media are facing stiff opposition from 
commercial media, as well as from the European Commission, which are raising the 
specter of unfair state-sponsored competition against market actors (a criticism, it should 
be noted, that commercial channels, many of them privatized in the 1980s, have been 
making since their inception).  
In sum, even as public media face new challenges and difficulties, this report establishes 
the continuing international viability, indeed vitality, of the public service model and 
provides a range of positive policy prescriptions, from funding mechanisms to citizen 
engagement and governance structures, for the United States as it considers needed 
expansions of its own very modest public media system. While it is unlikely that 
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the United States would adopt any of these models directly, the report quite clearly 
demonstrates that public service broadcasters play an important civic role in overseas 
markets, remedying the classic market failure in the production of quality, independent, 
commercial-free journalism. The models herein should be considered a starting point for 
discussion, acknowledging that each would have to be modified for the American media 
and political context. 
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PART I: PUBLIC MEDIA AROUND THE WORLD
America is unique among western democracies in its nearly complete reliance on 
commercial media to present comprehensive information about government and 
politics, to hold political and business elites to account through critical commentary and 
investigative reporting, and to provide a forum for a broad range of voices and viewpoints. 
At its best, this system has produced Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative reporting and 
in-depth, long form journalism. But for much of the time and for most media outlets and 
their audiences, entertainment, crime and disaster news, and light, human-interest stories 
have been the dominant tendency. PBS and NPR, created in the early 1970s, were a very 
modest attempt to add a little more public affairs to the media content balance. In recent 
years, of course, cable television and the Internet have provided additional outlets for 
public affairs content. But few of these outlets, whether privately or publicly funded, reach 
a broad public audience.  
In contrast to the highly fragmented and mostly commercial American media, the media 
in virtually every other western democratic nation-state are a mix of private and public. 
And in many cases public media are the leading media, both in terms of audience size and 
in terms of quality and independence, as numerous comparative studies have shown: 
•	 In	a	comparative	study	of	election	news	coverage	by	national	private	and	public	
television	channels	in	Germany,	England	and	France,	and	national	private	channels	
in	the	United	States,	Zurich-based	scholar	Frank	Esser	(2008:	412,	416,	422-425)	
found	“more	extensive	[election]	coverage	on	public	than	commercial	channels”	in	
all	of	the	European	countries.	He	also	reports	that	French	public	channel	France	2’s	
coverage	was	the	most	likely	to	focus	on	policy	substance,	and	that	“the	toughest	
candidate	interviews	aired	on	the	British	channels,”	including	the	public	BBC.	
•	 Recent	research	comparing	publicly	and	privately	owned	television	news	in	
Denmark,	Finland,	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	United	States	by	scholars	James	
Curran,	Shanto	Iyengar,	Anker	Brink	Lund	and	Inka	Salovaara-Moring	(2009)	
shows	that	“public	service	television	gives	greater	attention	to	public	affairs	and	
international	news,	and	thereby	fosters	greater	[public]	knowledge	in	these	areas,	
than	the	market	model.”	In	this	sophisticated	study,	which	combines	content	
analysis	with	survey	research,	Curran	and	colleagues	also	found	that	public	service	
television	“encourages	higher	levels	of	news	consumption	and	contributes	to	a	
smaller	within-nation	gap	between	the	advantaged	and	disadvantaged.”
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•	 Research	has	also	shown	that	publicly	subsidized	newspapers	in	Sweden,	Norway	
and	France	(Strömbäck	and	Dimitrova	2006;	Skogerbø	1997;	Benson	and	Hallin	
2007;	Benson	2009b,	2010)	tend	to	provide	more	original,	critical,	in-depth	and	
multiperspectival	coverage	than	their	advertising-dependent	counterparts	(either	in	
their	own	countries,	or	in	the	United	States).		
How is it possible that publicly funded media can perform just as well or better than 
commercial media? For starters, it needs to be kept in mind that the alternative to 
government-facilitated public support for media is not a blank check providing no-
strings-attached “independence,” but rather alternative forms of dependence. Advertising 
support, generally from large business corporations, can be just as or more problematic 
as state funding. Research has documented the ways in which advertising funding tends 
to dampen, to say the least, critical reporting of business (Collins 1992; Baker 1994; 
Davis 2002; Hamilton 2004). But given that businesses also want to assure good relations 
with government and diverse consumer publics, they also tend to push (subtly or not 
so subtly) for news that will avoid causing offense or disturbing the status quo. For this 
reason, paradoxically, publicly funded media such as the BBC are often more willing to 
take risks than commercial media. During the Iraq war, which involved significant British 
involvement, the “BBC was more likely to be accused of being an enemy of the state than a 
patriotic cheerleader” (Robertson 2003). 
What matters for both public and private media are the procedures and policies in place 
to assure both adequate funding and independence from any single owner, funder or 
regulator. Inside corporate-owned newsrooms, as profit pressures have increased, informal 
“walls” protecting the editorial side from business interference have crumbled. In contrast, 
the walls protecting public media are often made of firmer stuff such as independent 
oversight boards and multiyear advance funding to assure that no publicly funded media 
outlet will suffer from political pressure or funding loss because of critical news coverage. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
This report documents the precise mechanisms for funding and protecting the journalistic 
autonomy of public media in leading western European democracies, as well as Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Our aim is to survey a range of democratic solutions 
to the common challenges posed by public media: How can they be adequately funded? 
And how can they maintain their independence from undue governmental interference or 
partisan political meddling? 
In Part II of this report, countries are listed alphabetically for ease of reading and reference 
purposes. Broadly, though, the countries follow three primary funding models: license fee 
only or primarily2 (Denmark, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), 
2  A few of the countries in this category also receive small amounts of sponsorships or other commercial revenues, 
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mixed license fee and advertising funding (France, Germany, Ireland), and mixed public 
funding and advertising (Australia, Belgium, Canada, The Netherlands, New Zealand). 
License fees refer to fees assessed to television-owning households and set aside only for 
the purpose of public media, generally television and radio. Public funding means that 
public broadcasters compete directly with all other general tax supported programs in the 
national (or regional) government’s budget.   
For each country, we document: 1) basic background information about the major public 
broadcasters; 2) the amount, means, mechanisms and duration of funding (all funding 
amounts are expressed in U.S. dollars, converted using Oanda Currency Converter, 
http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter, at the rate of July 1 for the year reported); 
3) the “external” government branches and agencies and “internal” media boards 
which oversee public media and help insulate them from political pressure, as well as 
procedures and laws governing appointments and purview; 4) new policy issues arising 
out of the transition to Internet platforms; 5) information about newspaper subsidies for 
those countries where they are offered; and 6) when available, content analysis research 
comparing the form and content of public media programming, especially news, with its 
commercial competitors. 
Our focus in this report is on audio-visual media, particularly television. In most countries, 
provisions for television and radio are closely linked. We also document procedures for 
public funding for newspapers, an important additional type of public media funding 
in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and most Scandinavian countries. Our findings are 
based on original source documents (including annual reports and websites), the latest 
scholarly research, and personal e-mail communications with more than 30 journalists, 
scholars, media executives, and government regulators with expertise on public media in 
the 14 countries examined in this report. 
In Part III, Table 1 provides up-to-date data on precise amounts and types of funding for 
public service broadcasting media in all countries studied, as well as for the United States. 
Table 2 provides a short summary for each country of funding sources, funding approvers, 
funding renewal process, legal protections of independence, and administrative buffers. 
It may be tempting to quickly dismiss European ways as products of vastly different 
civilizations: It may work in Europe, so this common argument goes, but it could never 
work here. Certainly, America will adopt its own unique policies, just as approaches vary 
across European and other democracies. Decisions about the role of the state and the 
market, however, are unavoidable. The history of American media, as numerous historians 
(see, e.g., McChesney 1993, Starr 2004) have shown, has been shaped by political struggles 
(not predetermined by “culture”) to decide how and under what conditions media should 
be oriented toward serving civic or commercial needs. And the truth is that American 
but these typically account for less than 5 percent of total revenues. BBC receives about 20 percent of its total 
revenues from the commercial operations of BBC World or direct government grants. However, domestic BBC is 
entirely funded by the license fee. 
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media — TV, radio, newspapers, magazines, and Internet — have and continue to receive 
significant public subsidies (Cook 1998, Cowan and Westphal 2010): The question is 
whether this public support is sufficient and whether it is being used as effectively as it 
could be to support democratic civic ends.
Is the role of the government and media policy moot in the age of the Internet? While it 
is surely true that the social organization of news media and their relations with diverse 
publics are complicated by the Internet, it is highly debatable whether this has led to a 
disintegration or dispersal of power, as some philosophers have argued. And while the 
Internet enables new forms of democratic public engagement, there is already considerable 
empirical evidence that old commercial media patterns are reappearing or even being 
accentuated on the Web, such as the continued dominance of a handful of large media 
conglomerates, homogeneous or ideologically narrow news coverage, and scoop-driven 
sensationalism. The title of one recent study (Fenton 2010) of the Internet’s effects on 
journalism sums up an all-too-frequent outcome: “New Media, Old News.” As noted, 
however, the Internet clearly poses new challenges for public media, and we will document 
the various ways in which these are being addressed. 
Finally, we want to be clear about the purpose of our report. Even given the demonstrated 
virtues of European public media, we are not suggesting that public media can or should 
replace private enterprises. Commercial and public media each have their blind spots. 
That’s why it’s important to have both. This report simply shows a range of concrete, 
workable ways that public media can be a stronger part of the mix. 
KEY FINDINGS
Public media, whether TV, radio or newspapers, attract sizeable audiences and are the 
market leaders in many countries. Without exception, the western European public 
broadcasting channels examined in this survey attract one-third or more of the national 
television audience. In contrast, audiences for public service channels in Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand, as well as the United States, tend to be significantly smaller. 
Public media are funded by a variety of sources, including license fees (assessed 
only to television set owners with revenues reserved for the media organization), 
direct government funding (general tax revenues), taxes on commercial media or 
telecommunications companies, advertising, and other commercial sources. The best 
funded public broadcasters, such as the U.K.’s BBC, Germany’s ARD/ZDF, and the various 
Scandinavian public broadcasters, tend to receive the lion’s share of their funding from 
license fees. In the Netherlands, the license fee was replaced with direct government 
appropriations beginning in 2000, with one result being a gradual decline of funding in 
subsequent years (Papathanassopoulos 2007: 155-156).
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The license fee itself is defended by many as a guarantee of autonomy and the means to 
provide a direct link between broadcasters and the public. As Papathanassopoulos (2007: 
156) argues, in contrast to the license fee, “Direct public or government funding may, 
in one way or another, seriously affect public broadcasters’ independence, or in the best 
case, the public perception of their independence.” In addition to establishing a buffer 
against dramatic changes in governmental funding, the license fee also has historically 
had “a social dimension,” in that “by contributing to their national public broadcaster, 
citizens felt that it was more accountable to them than to the politicians.” (ibid.: 156). 
In the American context, public broadcasters have long argued that direct charitable 
contributions from local citizens to local stations serve a similar role. The question then is 
how public policy can help strengthen that connection without implementing a license-fee 
model. 
Public service media’s professional autonomy and optimal democratic functioning are 
promoted through a variety of means:  
•	 First,	in	several	countries,	including	Australia,	the	U.K.,	Denmark,	and	Germany,	
funding	is	established	for	multiyear	periods,	thus	lessening	the	capacity	of	
the	government	to	directly	link	funding	to	either	approval	or	disapproval	of	
programming.			
•	 Second,	public	media	seem	to	be	strongest	when	citizens	feel	that	media	are	
responsive	to	them	rather	than	to	politicians	or	advertisers	(i.e.,	when	they	are	
truly	“public”).	Funding	structures	and	oversight	organizations	that	create	a	direct	
link	between	public	media	and	their	audiences,	such	as	in	Denmark,	Germany,	
the	Netherlands,	and	the	U.K.,	foster	citizen	engagement,	involvement	and	
accountability.
•	 Third,	the	legal	and	administrative	charters	establishing	public	broadcasters	almost	
uniformly	emphasize	mandates	to	provide	diverse,	high-quality	programming,	and	
inclusion	of	a	wide	variety	of	voices	and	viewpoints.	At	the	same	time,	in	many	
cases,	these	charters	and	related	media	laws	have	strictly	restricted	the	capacity	
of	governments	to	attempt	to	influence	programming	in	a	partisan	direction,	
or	even	to	determine	funding	except	according	to	very	narrow	technical	criteria	
(as	in	Germany).	In	the	United	Kingdom,	the	BBC	“Trust”	oversees	the	BBC;	the	
government	has	its	most	significant	power	during	the	negotiations	over	the	BBC’s	
10-year	Royal	Charter.	However,	between	charter	negotiations,	the	BBC	Trust	and	by	
extension	the	BBC	have	significant	autonomy	from	governmental	interference.3	The	
Swedish	public	broadcaster,	SVT,	is	likewise	governed	by	a	multiyear	charter	(in	this	
case,	three	years)	and	owned	by	an	independent	foundation,	Förvaltningsstiftelsen	
för	Sveriges	Radio	AB,	specifically	designed	to	insulate	SVT	from	both	state	and	
market	pressures.			
3 Remarks of BBC Director-General Mark Thompson, Conference on “Public Media in a Digital Age,” sponsored by 
The New America Foundation and Free Press, Washington, D.C., October 5, 2010.
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•	 Fourth,	oversight	agencies	and/or	administrative	boards	of	one	type	or	another	
exist	in	all	countries	to	serve	as	a	buffer	between	the	public	broadcasters	and	the	
government	in	power.	The	independence	of	such	agencies	or	boards	is	bolstered	
through	a	variety	of	means:	through	staggered	terms,	limiting	the	capacity	of	a	new	
government	to	immediately	control	all	appointments	(Canada,	France);	through	
dispersal	of	authority	to	make	appointments;	and	through	multiple	layers	of	
“external”	and	“internal”	oversight,	creating	an	“arms-length”	relationship	between	
the	public	broadcaster	and	partisan	political	interference	or	meddling	(in	all	
countries,	but	especially	in	the	U.K.,	Germany,	and	the	Scandinavian	countries).	In	
all	the	countries	in	our	study,	governments	and	oversight	agencies	are	prohibited,	
by	law	and	by	custom,	from	engaging	in	any	pre-broadcasting	censorship.	
As a result of these policies, not only have public service broadcasters continued to 
provide high quality, diverse programming, they have also been responsible for airing 
critical investigations of government performance (notably in Denmark, Canada and the 
U.K.). Likewise, subsidized newspapers in Sweden, Norway and France have provided 
consistently high-quality, in-depth, and often critical news coverage of government and 
the leading political parties.4 Numerous scholarly content analyses demonstrating the 
democratic virtues of public over commercial media and many examples of outstanding 
critical news coverage by public media are presented in the individual country profiles.
 
In the United States, public media are funded through direct government annual 
appropriations, which have been and will continue to be problematic.  While we 
acknowledge that the license fee model will likely never gain a foothold in the United 
States, nor do we think a regressive tax is the right answer, we do need to look for new 
ways of more deeply connecting citizens to their public media system. If we seek to create 
strong public media — as free as possible from both political and commercial influences, 
yet deeply committed to a democratic civic mission — then a sustainable, long-term trust 
fund is perhaps the best model. This approach could build upon the experiences of trust 
ownership forms developed in the United Kingdom and Sweden.  
Today, democratic public media systems in Europe, North America, and elsewhere face 
challenges on a number of fronts. Far more than partisan political meddling (though 
this has occurred in some cases, notably in France), European scholars and journalists we 
consulted for this study emphasized the threat to public broadcasters posed by increasing 
commercial pressures, and, in general, the increasing difficulty of balancing the need 
to appeal to a broad audience (to justify the license fee) and to uphold public service 
values such as high-quality programming across multiple genres, in-depth information, 
promotion of democratic citizenship, and provision of “access to and reflection of 
society in diverse or proportional ways” (McQuail 2003: 27; Blumler 2010, personal 
communication). 
4  For another survey of research demonstrating the critical, in-depth, and ideologically diverse character of public 
media, both audio-visual and print, see Benson (2011, in press). 
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Public media face increasing competition from commercial channels, which in turn see 
public media’s access to both public funds and advertising (in some cases), as well as 
unfettered access to the Internet, as unfair competition. Commercial television owners 
argue for the obsolescence of public service television in the age of cable television and 
the Internet, even though research has shown that public broadcasters continue to offer 
programming (news, educational and children’s programs, and programs appealing 
to diverse minorities) generally not offered by commercial stations. At the same time, 
increases in license fees or direct government appropriations have often failed to keep pace 
with increasing costs, forcing a dilution of programming quality. 
Some public broadcasters are better funded and operated than others. Our survey 
highlights the notable strengths of public media systems in the U.K., Germany and 
Scandinavian countries. In contrast, due to erosion in both the amount of funding and 
procedures for assuring “arms-length” autonomy from direct governmental control (shift 
from license fee to direct government funding, shift from multiyear to annual funding, 
etc.), public media have arguably been weakened in recent years in the Netherlands, 
Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.
Likewise, in the transition to digital and Internet platforms, countries with public service 
broadcasting are adopting a variety of approaches to maintain or increase public funding, 
some more conducive than others to maintaining an important role for public service 
media. Historically, license fees were determined simply by the presence or absence of a 
television in the home (as is still the case in the U.K., Germany and Finland). Recently, 
though, countries such as Denmark have altered this definition somewhat to include any 
device that can display television content (e.g., computers). Other Scandinavian countries 
are discussing a shift from the narrowly conceived television license fee to a more general 
media fee (Finland) or replacing it with direct government funding (Norway). While 
advertising or online merchandising might seem to offer an additional means of funding 
public media’s online expansion, public service broadcasters already are facing stiff 
opposition from commercial media, as well as from the European Commission, which are 
raising the specter of unfair state-sponsored competition against market actors.5 
In sum, even as public media face new challenges and difficulties, this report establishes 
the continuing international viability, indeed vitality, of the public service model and 
provides a range of positive policy prescriptions for the United States as it considers 
needed expansions of its own public media.
5  As detailed in this report, much of European public service broadcasters’ transition to online has involved the 
adjudication of the European Commission. Commercial broadcasters in several member countries (Netherlands, 
Denmark, Germany and the U.K.) have questioned the legality of funding public broadcasters online. Questions 
focus on whether and how public broadcasters may be permitted to expand online services. Broadly, the European 
Commission has tended to favor a solution known as “public value tests.”  To introduce a new online service, public 
broadcasters must submit a plan to their national regulatory authority that demonstrates a social need for the ser-
vice and the estimated effect such a service will have on commercial competitors. These tests must be carried out 
prior to the approval of any new service. See, e.g., Aslama and Syvertsen (2007), Donders and Pauwels (2008) and 
Open Society Institute (2005).
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PART II: COUNTRY PROFILES
AUSTRALIA
Overview
Australia has two public service broadcasters: the Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
(ABC) and the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS). ABC is modeled after the BBC and aims 
to provide traditional public service content on TV and radio; SBS aims to provide a more 
specialized service of multicultural and multilingual programming (Hitchens 2006: 24). 
ABC (all channels included) has an audience share of 14 percent; SBS reaches 5 percent 
of the total audience (OzTAM 2010). Due to ABC’s status as the major public broadcaster, 
we focus primarily below on its funding and oversight. Australia is also notable for its 
Community Broadcasting Association which coordinates nonprofit community radio 
stations (CBAA 2010). 
Funding
ABC receives nearly all its funding directly from the government via legislative 
appropriations, and is prohibited by law from airing commercial advertising on domestic 
television and radio services (although it does have the capacity to earn additional revenue 
via merchandising). Early in its history, ABC was funded by a license fee, though this 
was abolished in 1973 when the Labor government argued that the near-universality of 
television and radio meant that direct public funding was a more equitable method of 
providing revenue (Inglis 2006). In 2008, ABC received $728.9 million (A$858.4 million) 
directly from the government (ABC 2009). SBS, by contrast, receives less funding from the 
government ($183.6 million, A$191 million in 2008), though it is permitted to carry some 
advertising (five minutes per hour of advertising and sponsorships)(SBS 2010; Hawkins 
2010: 289). Funding now occurs triennially. The public service broadcasters initiate the 
process by preparing a three-year budget proposal, which is then submitted to the federal 
government. The government then determines whether to accept or revise those figures 
in that year’s annual budget. This budget is then brought before Parliament for approval 
(Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy 2010).
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Protections of Autonomy and Accountability
Both ABC and SBS are statutory authorities functioning as independent corporations with 
their own legislation and charters. ABC is governed by the Australian Broadcasting Act of 
1983, while SBS is regulated according to the Special Broadcasting Service Act of 1991. Both 
acts set forth a variety of legal protocols to ensure editorial independence (Hitchens 2006). 
The Australian Communications and Media Authority is an independent agency with 
regulatory oversight over all broadcasting, radio, and telecommunications. It is governed 
by a board of seven members. 
ABC is presided over by a board of directors with eight members: seven are appointed 
by the governor-general on the recommendation of the government in power, and 
the eighth is the managing director appointed by the board who serves for five years. 
In 2007, Labor announced a plan for a new system to appoint board members 
“assessed on merit” through a nomination panel ”established at arm’s length from 
government.” The government would then be required to either select a candidate from 
the panel’s recommendation or to explain in detail its alternative choice. As of July 
2010, six appointments had been made using this process (Department of Broadband, 
Communications and the Digital Economy 2010). 
Transition to the Internet
In October 2008, the government released a discussion paper entitled, “ABC and SBS: 
Towards a Digital Future,” in which it sought comments regarding how to deal with the 
online transition. The report broadly posed two questions: What sort of content should 
public service broadcasters be expected to provide? And how should this be funded? 
The report drew 2,431 comments from both groups and individuals and led to the 
development of a new online strategy, titled “Strengthening our National Broadcasters” 
(Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy 2009). “The 
importance of the ABC’s information services was particularly prominent in submissions 
to the review, with over 1,600 respondents stating that public broadcasters should 
provide credible, independent news and current affairs programming” (OECD 2009: 
77). This report included both major funding increases for ABC and SBS as well as a 
significant policy statement regarding expectations for the public service broadcasters. The 
government promised an additional $178.2 million (A$185.3) over three years to expand 
the range of programming, including a new television channel and website dedicated to 
commercial-free children’s programming and a Continuous News Centre designed to help 
ABC create 24-hour news across digital and broadcast platforms. 
Comments to the initial government inquiry overwhelmingly supported the continuation 
of commercial-free services. SBS’s mixed model received criticism for allowing advertising 
during programming and, while the report acknowledged such criticisms, it stated that 
due to the economic recession, a new restriction on “in-program advertising would 
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substantially reduce the amount of funding available to SBS to support the provision 
of high quality diverse programming” (ibid.: 17) and concluded that the current model 
should be left as is for the moment.
Why It Matters: News Content and Public Knowledge
Both ABC and SBS enjoy broad public support. Additionally, viewers of public service 
broadcasters in Australia have higher levels of political knowledge than consumers of 
commercial news. Jones and Pusey (2010), for instance, find positive correlations between 
respondents who watch ABC or SBS regularly and are able to provide correct answers to 
basic questions concerning the Australian political system and current events. Conversely, 
those responding incorrectly to these questions were correlated with a preference for 
commercial sources, leading the authors to write: “the high correlation between reliance 
on commercial television for news and information and lack of political knowledge is 
remarkable” (p. 465). 
Survey research (ABC 2009) has shown that 89 percent of respondents believe that ABC 
provides quality programming and 83 percent believe ABC provides “fair and impartial 
reporting” of news and current affairs. In the government’s recent policy statement about 
the future of public broadcasters, the level of positive response in the public commenting 
period led the report authors to note “clear evidence of the esteem in which the two 
organizations [ABC and SBS] are held by Australians” (ibid.: 2). 
BELGIUM
Overview
The television industry in Belgium is linguistically split, primarily between Flemish and 
French-speaking communities with a relatively small German-language sector. The primary 
focus here will be on the Flemish and French broadcasters. Within the Flemish-language 
market, the public broadcaster, VRT (1930), captures the largest audience share (32 percent 
in 2008), followed by the lead commercial broadcaster, VTM (1989, 21 percent). A second 
public channel, Ketnet (also run by VRT) receives 9 percent, while a smattering of niche 
channels, typically originating either in the Netherlands or Britain receive the remainder 
of the audience.6 The French market is led by commercial broadcaster RTL (1989) with 
19 percent of the 2008 audience. France’s TF-1 ranks second, with 17 percent, and the 
public broadcaster, RTBF (1930) takes third with 15 percent (De Bens 2004; European 
Audiovisual Observatory 2009). 
6  All audience share data are from European Audiovisual Observatory (2009), unless otherwise noted. All figures 
are from the latest year available, which may vary across countries.
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Funding
Each of the language markets has its own public service broadcaster. In the Flemish 
sector, total VRT revenues in 2008 were $560.9 million (€457.9 million), of which 74 
percent comes from a government grant. The remaining $145.8 million (26 percent) is 
secured through advertising. In the French-speaking sector, RTBF’s total revenues for 2008 
amounted to $474 million, with $390 million (82 percent) coming from government 
grants and the remaining $84 million (18 percent) from advertising and sponsorships. 
BRF, the German-language public broadcaster, operates with a comparatively modest $7.3 
million (2006 figure, breakdown between public and commercial funding not provided)
(European Audiovisual Observatory 2009; for background, see De Bens 2004). 
The primary form of funding for both the Flemish and French-language public 
broadcasters is government appropriations that are established between the broadcaster 
and ruling government via a “management contract.” These contracts (created every five 
years) set forth funding levels for the length of the contract and tie that funding to a 
variety of performance criteria (D’Haenens et al. 2009). Objectives are established in four 
broad areas — services (e.g. reach and appreciation), innovation, staff policy and financial 
management; annual funding increases are contingent upon meeting these criteria. Annual 
reports are required to establish whether these objectives have been met; a representative 
of the public broadcaster must then present this report to Parliament. 
These contracts are themselves relatively recent inventions in Belgium’s media policy 
process (Coppens and Saeys 2006). Prior to their creation in 1997, a license-fee system 
was used. Critics claimed that this left public service broadcasters both underfunded 
and unaccountable. Since the implementation of these contracts, audience shares have 
increased for public service broadcasters (De Bens 2004; d’Haenens and Saeys 2001). 
Scholars have questioned the general transparency involved in this process: whereas laws 
need to go through lengthy parliamentary processes, contracts are formed between a single 
department within the ruling government and the public service broadcasters (Coppens 
and Saeys 2006).
Protections of Autonomy and Accountability
Public service broadcasters are mandated to “reach a maximum number of viewers and 
listeners with a range of programmes which excite and satisfy the interest of viewers and 
audiences” (VRT 2010). Both Flemish and French-language broadcasters must produce 
relevant national programming designed for intended audiences. This is an issue due to 
the high level of cable penetration in the country and the dominance of international 
programming from other European countries. Mandates are put forth in “media decrees” 
passed by Parliament and then specified under management contracts established between 
the ruling government and the public broadcaster (Donders 2010). 
 19
PUBLIC MEDIA AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE: Lessons for the Future of Journalism from Around the World
There are two primary types of external buffers. First, there are national regulatory 
authorities — for the Flemish community this is the Vlaamse Regulator voor de Media 
(VRM), for the French it is the Conseil Superieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA). Both agencies are 
intended to ensure that the public service broadcasters carry out the objectives set forth 
in their contracts. They have no legal authority to intervene in programming decisions. 
VRM is led by a five-person general board: by law, this must include a chairman, a judge 
and three media professionals. These appointments are made by the Flemish government 
and do not require parliamentary approval (Machet 2002). CSA consists of a four-person 
council. One member is appointed by the government, and three are appointed by the 
lower chamber of the legislature (Machet 2002). 
The other buffer is the Media Council (Sectoral Council for the Media). This council is an 
independent advisory body composed of industry professionals and academics. Legally, they 
have no binding authority and they are not part of the contract creation process. They make 
non-binding recommendations to the government whether new services should be enacted, 
based on proposals put forth by the public service broadcasters (Donders 2010: 52).  
A 12-person Board of Governors oversees the public service broadcasters (VRT 2010). 
These individuals are appointed by the ruling government and serve for a period of five 
years. Their tasks include: approval of the management contract, oversight of finances, 
and the hiring and firing of executive committee members. This executive committee 
consists of four individuals: managing director, and three general managers, in charge of 
media, production and general affairs, respectively. The three general managers assist the 
managing director in the daily management of VRT. The four-person Executive Committee 
tends to all matters not explicitly delegated to the Board of Governors and the General 
Shareholders Meeting.
Transition to the Internet
VRT online content is funded through the same mixture of public money and advertising 
revenues as television and radio. In annual reports, VRT describes itself at a moment of 
transition from a “traditional radio and television broadcaster” to a “digital broadcaster, 
focusing on radio, televisual, internet and mobile applications” (VRT 2010). To this end, 
it has introduced a “digital media factory” project that seeks to have all broadcast content 
available online, both for a broad public audience and more narrowly focused niches. 
There is some debate about how funding for new VRT services (especially online ones) 
will be arranged. In March 2009, the Flemish parliament passed a decree stating that any 
new services from VRT must be approved by the Flemish government before actually being 
produced; approval would be contingent on the recommendation of the Sectoral Council 
for the Media. Some scholars see this move as consistent with the adoption of  “public 
value tests” (as in the U.K.), whose proponents in Belgium see as crucial to preventing 
VRT from gaining an unfair competitive advantage online. Public broadcasting advocates 
counter that public media are in no position to threaten commercial competitors and 
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that public value tests are thus a waste of time and money. At the moment, it appears 
there is little consensus on the issue and that it is unlikely such a test will be implemented 
(Donders 2010). 
Newspaper subsidies
Since 1974, Belgium has provided indirect (preferential postal rates, reduced rates for 
rail transport, and lower VAT sales taxes) aid to all newspapers and direct subsidies to 
newspapers with low circulations and advertising revenues. As of 1989, aid to the press 
became the responsibility of the separate French and Flemish communities (Blanchart 
2006: 94-95). In 1999, the Flemish government ended direct subsidies but continued 
indirect support (de Bens 2010). The French community revised its press aid in 2004 to 
create a “Centre for Aid to the Written Press” supported by general government revenues 
and a tax on television advertising revenues at the inflation-indexed level of $7.6 million 
(€6.2 million).  Programs include: 1) support for the creation of new daily newspapers 
during their first three years of operation, 2) aid to newspapers linked to the “absolute 
number of employed professional journalists” in order to promote high “editorial quality,” 
3) initiatives to distribute daily newspapers in educational institutions and to “generate 
press awareness among pupils,” and 4) continuation of programs to “ensure the greatest 
possible diversity within the daily press” by aiding those newspapers that are “the least 
profitable” (Blanchart 2006: 96-97).  
Why It Matters: News Content and Public Knowledge
RTBF was found in one analysis to offer “more and longer newscasts” than the 
commercial competitors, which tend to import much of their content from abroad 
(D’Haenens et al. 2009).
CANADA
Overview
The Canadian television industry is linguistically split between French and English 
speaking segments. Within the English-language market, the public broadcaster CBC 
(Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, founded in 1936) captured 9 percent of the 
audience in 2008. Two commercial broadcasters capture larger audience shares: CTV 
(founded in 1961, originally the Canadian Television Network) had a 33 percent audience 
share, followed by CanWest’s Global TV (1974) with 19 percent. Shaw Communications 
(1966) had a 9 percent audience share. Rogers (1931), which also provides cable and 
Internet services, owns CityTV, which accounts for 5 percent audience share. The French 
language market is more consolidated. Télévision de Radio-Canada (the French language 
version of the CBC) had a 17 percent audience share in 2008. Quebecor Media captured 
58 percent and Cogeco (1957) had 25 percent (Winseck 2008: 31; Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation 2009). 
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Funding
Total CBC revenues in 2008 were $1.6 billion (1.7 billion CDN), of which 64 percent 
came from government appropriations. This total figure is for all of the CBC, including 
television and radio, as well as both CBC in English and Télévision de Radio Canada 
in French. The remaining revenues, $579.7 million, came from advertising and other 
commercial services, such as licensing and service provisions. CBC Radio has not carried 
advertising since 1974, except when required by law (e.g. during federal elections, it 
must carry advertising for political parties). On the other hand, limits on the amount of 
television advertising were abolished in 2009 (Canadian Radio and Television Council 
2010). However, advertising on both public television and online services tend to be “less 
pervasive” (no precise figures provided) than advertising on commercial media (Sparks et 
al. 2006). 
The CBC is funded through a direct annual parliamentary appropriation. Under the 
Broadcasting Act of 1991, the CBC is established as a government department reporting 
to the Ministry of Heritage (responsible for arts, culture, media, and sports programs and 
policies) with a duty to submit an annual budget for approval by the current government. 
Some scholars have criticized the annual appropriation process as designed to keep the 
CBC “on a short leash” by “making long term planning difficult” (see Skinner 2008: 16). 
Likewise, critics have suggested the process submits the CBC to a greater degree of partisan 
upheaval than the British model of finance via license fees (Trudel and Abran 1996). In 
March 2008, the Conservative Party-controlled House of Commons’ Standing Committee 
on Canadian Heritage released a report on the role of the CBC in the 21st century, calling 
for the establishment of a seven-year memorandum of understanding that would set 
forth expectations for the CBC and create funding commitments from the government. In 
June 2008, the ruling Conservative government announced that it would not support the 
conclusions in the report (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2009). 
Protections of Autonomy and Accountability
The CBC’s mandate is set forth by Parliament in the Broadcasting Act of 1991: to “provide 
radio and television services incorporating a wide range of programming that informs, 
enlightens and entertains.” Programming is required to be “predominantly Canadian” 
and available both in English and French to “contribute to shared national consciousness 
and identity.” Independence from government interference is also established in the Act, 
Section 46(5): “The Corporation shall, in the pursuit of its objects and in the exercise 
of its powers, enjoy freedom of expression and journalistic, creative and programming 
independence.” 
While the overall mandate is spelled out by Parliament, oversight and enforcement is done 
by a separate agency: the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunication Commission 
(CRTC, created in 1968 through a previous broadcasting act), which regulates all 
broadcasting and telecommunications activity in Canada. Mendel (2000) writes that 
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oversight tends to focus more on achieving the principles set forth in the mandate than 
on interfering in the day-to-day operations of the CBC. The CRTC has no power to 
censor CBC programs. Mendel notes that Perrin Beatty, a former cabinet minister in the 
Conservative government of Brian Mulroney, continued to serve as president of the CBC 
through two terms of Liberal leadership at the federal level.  
 
The CRTC reports to the Canadian Parliament through the Ministry of Canadian Heritage. 
It operates at an “arms-length from government” (Mendel 2000) and while the executive 
has legal authority to override CRTC decisions, in the Broadcasting Act it is stated that this 
can only happen when the decision taken by the CRTC distracts from attaining the policy 
objectives as set out in the Act. 
The prime minister appoints individuals to the CRTC, which is composed of a chairman, 
two vice-chairmen and 10 commissioners. All positions are appointed to five-year terms 
and are staggered. No specific criteria for CRTC appointments are contained in the 
broadcasting legislation. One analysis (Gates 1998) noted: “All prime ministers except 
[Pierre] Trudeau [1968-1984] and [Louis] St. Laurant [1948-1957] have shown some 
willingness to appoint individuals of a differing political affiliation. Every government 
has appointed some known non-partisans.” Typically, appointees have experience either 
in broadcasting, law or business. Since 1984, CRTC appointees have received salaries and 
been employed full-time.  
As stipulated in the Broadcasting Act, a 12-person Board of Directors is responsible for the 
management of the CBC.  The prime minister makes all appointments; all terms last five 
years. From 1936-1998, 90 percent of appointees were part time and received a per diem 
rather than a salary (Gates 1998). 
Transition to the Internet
The transition to online takes place within two broad discussions about (1) the 
transformation of CBC/Radio Canada into a multiplatform “content company” rather 
than a broadcaster with “separate and discrete media lines” (Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation 2009) and (2) the financial funding necessary for such a set-up. Because 
“online” is not treated as a separate channel, funding for it comes from existing television 
and radio production budgets and is not broken down separately in annual financial 
reports (it has been this way since the launch of Web services was reported in the 1999-
2000 annual report). With 4.8 million unique monthly visitors, CBC.ca is Canada’s most 
popular English language news site online. Podcasts prove popular as well, with audiences 
downloading more than 2 million podcasts monthly (ibid.: 18).
The second issue of financing the CBC in a digital age is a continuation of long-standing 
funding issues for the corporation. Broadly, there are two main issues, and concerns/
initiatives stem from one or the other. First, the CBC is partially dependent on advertising 
revenues and is therefore subject to general market fluctuations and more specific 
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transformations in the allocation of advertising dollars. In the 2008-2009 budget, 
advertising revenues were off $65 million against budget estimates; estimated shortfalls 
against the budget for 2009-2010 are $171 million (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
2009). Second, the CBC’s primary source of revenue — government appropriations — 
is set annually. This arrangement makes long-term financial planning difficult for the 
corporation, and it has lobbied repeatedly to institute a multiyear agreement. As noted, the 
House of Commons’ Committee on Canadian Heritage released a report in 2008 with this 
suggestion — a seven year memorandum of understanding that would set forth funding 
commitments — but was not supported by the ruling Conservative government. 
Short of broad changes to these two above-mentioned features, the CBC is left to seek 
funding initiatives within this structure. One new revenue stream is a CRTC proposal 
for value-to-signal models, which would permit conventional television broadcasters to 
negotiate compensation from cable and satellite companies for the value of their signals, 
which these services (cable and satellite) provide without compensation. This proposal 
puts CBC together with other traditional broadcasters (e.g. CTV and Global) in demanding 
payments from cable and satellite providers (e.g. Bell, Rogers, and Shaw). 
On the side of government appropriations, in March 2009 the Ministry of Canadian 
Heritage announced the consolidation of the Canadian Television Fund into a new 
Canadian Media Fund whose purpose is to finance original Canadian productions on 
a variety of platforms. In the past, 37 percent (roughly $100 million Canadian) of the 
CTF was dedicated to the CBC (the rest was competed for by broadcasters and individual 
producers). The new CMF broadens the distribution reach beyond television (requiring 
recipients to make the work available on a minimum of two distribution platforms), 
though it is not clear whether a certain percentage will be set aside solely for the CBC, a 
move the corporation prefers. 
Why It Matters: News Content and Public Knowledge
A variety of analyses demonstrate that the CBC provides greater, in-depth news coverage, 
especially with regards to original “Canadian” programming7 and international news, than 
its commercial competitors. Hoskins et al. (2001) find that the CBC shows a much higher 
percentage of Canadian programming than private broadcasters. CBC English Television is 
81 percent Canadian throughout the day, with the percentage rising to 91 percent during 
prime time. In contrast, commercial broadcasters hover consistently around the 50 percent 
level required by the CRTC. On international coverage, the CBC employs more reporters 
and operates more foreign bureaus than CTV or any other commercial broadcaster. 
One analysis (Morrison 1998) finds CBC coverage to be more informational and less 
sensational, with “more in-depth reporting” than commercial counterparts. 
7  Concerns regarding the amount of available Canadian programming are a perennial issue in Canadian broadcast 
policy. Due to the relatively cheap and accessible programming available from the United States, a primary reason 
for creating a public broadcaster was to assure that programming produced by Canadians and for Canadians would 
be available. At times, this has led to strategic equivalence between “national” programming and “public” program-
ming to the protest of French-speaking Québécois (Raboy 1990).  
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Within the CBC, producers have generally been free of constraints from management (e.g. 
boards of directors), just as the CBC as an institution has generally been free of constraints 
imposed by government (Raboy 1990: 167). Occasional examples to the contrary are 
generally seen as proving the rule. In the 1960s, a popular (and entertaining) public affairs 
show, “This Hour Has Seven Days,” was taken off the air amidst a crisis of national unity 
for highlighting divisions between English- and French-speaking Canadians (Raboy and 
Koch 1986). More indicative of the contemporary relationship between CBC producers and 
the state was the airing on CBC News of three documentary films in March and April 1992 
about Canadian involvement in World War II. Media scholar David Taras (1995: 725) writes 
that the films “aggressively challenged the conventional wisdom that Canadian servicemen 
had performed magnificently and with great chivalry in a cause unblemished by the stain of 
dishonor. Though the documentary emphasized the dignity and bravery of ordinary soldiers 
in a graphic and powerful way, it delivered a seething indictment of what it depicted as the 
immorality and incompetence of senior Canadian and British commanders.”  
The CBC enjoys broad public support. A 2008 poll by Friends of Canadian Public 
Broadcasting found that, nationwide, about 76 percent of respondents either favored the 
CBC’s current funding levels or wanted them increased. Only 14 percent said they favored 
cutting the CBC budget (Cobb 2008). 
The CBC has garnered prestigious national awards (the Michener Award) for journalistic 
excellence. In 2008, it shared honors with the Canadian Press Agency for bringing to light 
the widespread use of taser guns by the RCMP (national police). In 1999, CBC radio was 
honored for its coverage of a vote-splitting scheme (in which independent candidates 
were encouraged and funded to run for office by the Conservative Party in an attempt to 
“split” the left-of-center votes away from the New Democratic Party) in the province of 
Manitoba. The CBC has also provided crucial investigative coverage in recent political 
scandals, both foreign (the case of the Afghan detainee scandal) and domestic (the Liberal 
Party sponsorship scandal). In the case of the Afghan detainees (which involved Canadian 
forces transferring prisoners to Afghan security forces who in turn tortured the prisoners), 
the CBC acquired and reported on crucial government documents implicating the national 
government in the scandal. In the case of the Liberal sponsorship scandal (Kozolanka 
2006), which entailed the funneling of public funds to the province of Quebec (for pro-
Canada sponsorship at public events) back into the coffers of the Liberal Party, CBC 
reporters were crucial in uncovering and broadcasting evidence of the issue. The event was 
key in leading to the subsequent electoral defeat of the Liberal Party, which had been in 
power for over a decade. Thus, while often accused of a “liberal” bias, the CBC has been 
considered by some a key actor in bringing down the Liberal Party.8 
8  In Canada, ruling governments can be forced to hold a new election when the opposition parties refuse to pass 
the budget. This happened in the case described above. Canada’s Liberal Party is a center-left party that is generally 
leftist on social issues (e.g. environment, health care, same-sex marriage) while championing balanced budgets and 
strong economic growth. In many ways it can be seen as comparable to the U.S. Democratic Party. Further to the 
left is the National Democratic Party, which has never controlled the executive but remains a key minority player in 
parliamentary politics, as Conservatives and Liberals need to consult with them in order to pass budgets.
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DENMARK
Overview
Public broadcasters are central players in Danish television, accounting for 69 percent of 
the total daily viewing audience (and 76 percent of the prime time audience). The older 
of the two primary public broadcasters, the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR), was 
founded in 1925, and in 2008 its two channels captured 29 percent of the total daily 
viewing audience. The newer public broadcaster, TV2, was founded in 1988: its seven 
channels had 40 percent of the 2008 audience share. Danish private channels (chiefly 
Kanals 4 and 5) account for only a slim portion of the total audience (1.5 percent); the 
bulk of the competition for public media comes from foreign channels, which account for 
30 percent of the total audience.
Funding 
In 2008, total revenues for DR were $787.9 million (€499.4 million), of which 91 percent 
came from the license fee. The remaining 9 percent derives from licensing and service 
provisions; there are no revenues from advertising. TV2 is also publicly owned; however, 
it is financed almost entirely by advertising and other commercial sources (some regional 
services of TV2 receive public funding). Total TV2 revenues in 2008 were $473.2 million 
(€299.9 million). While TV2 captures the largest audience share, it is in poor financial 
health and faces an uncertain legal future, as the Danish government has sought to 
privatize it, so far without success, since 2003 (European Audiovisual Observatory 2009). 
The focus of the analysis to follow is on DR.
In 2010, the license fee was $389 per year. The fee is paid per household on the basis of 
owning a television or any other media device that can receive television broadcasters 
(e.g. personal computers with Internet access, mobile phones, etc.). DR itself collects the 
fee biannually, through an administrative arm known as DR Licens. Parliament sets the 
license fee every four years, as stipulated in the Radio and Television Act. DR’s executive 
board sets the budget for its activities annually. This budget is submitted for approval to 
both the Ministry of Culture and the Danish Parliament (Denmark Radio and Television 
Broadcasting Act 2010).
Protections of Autonomy and Accountability
Every four years, DR and the Ministry of Culture enter into a contract that sets forth the 
tasks DR is expected to perform in that period. The contract defines DR’s public service 
purposes, including: strengthening citizens’ capacity for democratic self-governance, 
reflecting the diversity of Denmark, stimulating creativity and culture, and promoting 
interest in a wide range of knowledge. Specific obligations include broadcasting a 
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minimum of 560 hours of original news programming a year between the hours of 5 p.m. 
and midnight; providing online news in the languages most commonly used by Danes 
and resident immigrants; and increasing the time devoted to Danish-produced drama by 
10 percent over the average output in the previous four-year contract (Danish Ministry of 
Culture 2007). 
Enforcement and oversight of that contract fall to the Radio and Television Board (RTB), 
an independent regulatory authority established in 2001. The RTB monitors both public 
and private broadcasters to ensure they are fulfilling their legal obligations (in DR’s 
case, this means fulfilling its public service function as set forth in the contract). As with 
many independent authorities in the realm of Danish cultural production, RTB is based 
on an “arm’s length principle,” the idea that while the Ministry of Culture may operate 
as the “architect” of cultural policy, it cannot intervene in the actual process of cultural 
production (Duelund and Valtysson 2010). It consists of eight members, seven appointed 
by the Ministry of Culture (i.e. neither parliamentary approval nor proportionality are 
required) (Fievé 2010, personal communication) and coming from backgrounds in law, 
finance, administration, business and media/cultural policy (Jauert and Sondergaard 
2007), and one nominated by the Cooperative Forum for Danish Listeners and Viewers 
Association (Denmark Radio and Television Broadcasting Act 2010). All members serve 
four-year terms (Herzog 2004). While all members are appointed at the same time, there 
are no term limits on reappointments; since establishment in 2001, there have been 
several members who continued from one four-year term to the next (Fievé 2010, personal 
communication). The RTB replaced the Broadcasting Councils, which were often referred 
to as “mini-parliaments” because the appointments were largely based on political 
affiliations (Humphreys 1996: 156) as opposed to the professional backgrounds that 
are necessary for appointments today. RTB was thus created to be a regulatory authority 
characterized more by professionalism and less by political partisanship. 
Internally, the Executive Board, made up of 11 members elected for four-year terms, 
provides a buffer between the public broadcasters and the government in power. The 
Ministry of Culture appoints three members, including the chairman; six are appointed 
by parliament, and two are selected by the employees of DR (DR Executive Board 2010). 
Parliamentary appointments are made proportionally, so that all of the major political 
parties can put forward their own appointee (Radio and Television Board of Denmark 
2004). The primacy of political affiliations is tempered somewhat by the requirement that 
Executive Board members be drawn from the realm of media and arts, as well as from 
politics, business, and management (Jauert, Poulsen and Sondergaard 2007; Radio and 
Television Board of Denmark 2004). Executive Board terms are not staggered, though 
board members can be re-appointed and frequently are. Since the model was introduced 
in 1988, it has never been the case that all members left at the same time. Typically, after 
an election some of the members appointed by the previous parliament will leave and if a 
new government takes power, the three members appointed by the previous minister will 
leave (Jauert 2010, personal communication). 
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The Executive Board maintains responsibility for the financial management of DR and 
conducts internal “value tests” to ensure that programming services meet the “cultural, 
democratic and social needs of society” (Danish Ministry of Culture 2007). The Executive 
Board, in turn, appoints members of the Management Board, which oversees day-to-day 
operations (especially programming decisions) of DR broadcasting. In sum, as Hallin 
and Mancini (2004: 169-170) note, Danish public broadcasters “shade more towards the 
parliamentary model [e.g. proportional representation in oversight divided among the 
relevant social and political groups], though still with a high level of autonomy.”
Transition to the Internet
DR Online is the largest Danish online news provider and has 24-hour staffing for its site  
(Danish Broadcasting Corporation 2008). Recent initiatives include a portal with health 
information, a portal that provides personal advice for young people, and a new delivery 
system that provides news content to screen at bus and train stations. Currently, the public 
broadcaster is free to develop online initiatives at it sees fit. There is a formal process 
wherein it submits plans to the RTB, which in turn provides “comments” on the proposed 
services. These comments are non-binding, though positive comments are typically seen 
as approval. It is expected that the board is “likely to have formal decision making powers 
[over online, just as it does for radio and television] in the near future” (Bron 2010: 49)
Why It Matters: News Content and Public Knowledge
Several content analyses demonstrate that Danish public broadcasters provide more 
hard news coverage than their domestic commercial competitors and U.S. commercial 
television. Curran et al. (2009) find 71 percent of all DR evening news programming to 
be “hard news,” while only 63 percent could be similarly classified in the United States. 
Public broadcasters are also found to do a more complete job of exposing the entire 
citizenry to public affairs news content. Whereas only 34 percent of low education (up 
to high school diploma) persons in the United States watch national television news, 72 
percent of similarly low educated citizens do so in Denmark. Another content analysis 
(Lund and Berg 2009) shows news and current affairs accounting for 49 percent of all 
programming content on the public broadcaster (DR) versus only 2 percent of all content 
on the leading domestic commercial channels (Kanals 4 and 5, combined). A recent 
study examining election news coverage of both DR and TV2 in 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005 
and 2007 found that the public channels “were not biased” and “were professionally 
balanced,” providing proportional coverage to all of the political parties according to their 
electoral strength (Hopmann 2009). 
In 2007, DR purchased, aired and defended a lengthy television documentary (“Den 
Hemmelige Krig”), which found the Danish government’s involvement in the Afghanistan 
War to have been established on a dubious legal basis in violation of the Geneva 
conventions. It also demonstrated the Danish government’s (a center-right coalition 
at the time) complicity in handing over prisoners to the American government, with 
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the knowledge that they, too, broke the conventions. The documentary was subject to 
harsh criticism from the prime minister, the minister of defense and several newspapers 
sympathetic to the center-right government. DR defended both the documentary and 
the decision to broadcast it. Eventually, it was subject to review by a group of experts at 
a journalism school and found to be a credible work of journalism (Kleis Nielsen 2010, 
personal communication; Bondbjerg 2009). 
FINLAND
Overview
In Finland, the public broadcaster, YLE (Yleisradio Oy), captures 41 percent of the daily 
audience share. That figure is spread out between its two channels, TV1 (the main news 
channel), which has 24 percent audience share and TV2, with 17 percent. The leading 
private channels are MTV3, Nelonen, and SubTV.
Funding
YLE’s total 2007 revenues were $553.7 million (€409.1 million), with 95 percent derived 
from license fees. The remaining portion was generated through private broadcasters’ 
licensing fees (a separate fee paid by commercial broadcasters for broadcast rights) and 
service provisions (e.g. sales of programs). Under current law, YLE may not generate 
additional income through advertising (Bron 2010). The fee is set annually by the Ministry 
of Transport and Communications and collected by the television fee office, a department of 
the ministry. The current license fee (2010), paid by all households with a television, is $295.
 
Protections of Autonomy and Accountability
The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA) is an independent 
regulatory authority (operating under the Ministry of Transport and Communications) 
of both private and public broadcasters. The agency’s duties include collecting the license 
fee and monitoring content and advertising amounts of television and radio programs. 
It has no legal authority to intervene in programming decisions prior to broadcast. It is 
headed by a Board of Directors, including a director-general (appointed by the Ministry 
of Transport and Communication) who serves for five years and may be reappointed. The 
other seven directors are appointed by the director-general (Lappalainen 2010, personal 
communication). 
YLE is overseen internally by a 21-member Administrative Council. Members are elected 
by parliament during the first parliamentary session and continue to serve until the end 
of the session (which normally lasts four years); they may be re-elected. Two additional 
representatives are appointed by YLE personnel and are entitled to attend and speak at 
the meetings of the Council (though they hold no voting power) (Prakke et al. 2004: 
219). Members of the YLE Administrative Council are elected by members of the different 
political parties and their political affiliations are listed on the annual reports. As of 
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2009, seven members belonged to the Centre Party, six to the Coalition Party, five to the 
Social Democratic Party9 and one each to the Swedish People’s Party, Green Party and Left 
Alliance. While members of the Administrative Council are political appointees, they are 
required by law (in the Act on Yleisradio Oy) to “comprise people familiar with science, 
art, educational work and business and economic life, and who represent different social 
and language groups” (Ministry of Transport and Communications in Finland 2005: 
2). The Council is charged with monitoring the administration of YLE and assuring that 
finances are properly spent.10 
In turn, the Administrative Council elects annually the Board of Directors, which 
comprises a minimum of five and a maximum of eight members. By law, Board members 
are not allowed to be members of the Administrative Council, nor belong to YLE’s senior 
management and should represent “diverse expertise.” By law, the Board’s task is to decide 
on the budget for the following year, to provide an annual report on finances and to elect 
and/or fire the public broadcaster’s managing director and to set his/her salary. It also 
hires and fires other members of the senior management. Finally, the Management Group 
is charged with day-to-day management of YLE: positions include the director-general, 
program areas directors (e.g. children’s TV, news, entertainment), etc. 
Transition to the Internet
Since 2004, the number of citizens paying the license fee has fallen. In 2009, a 
parliamentary working group issued a report recommending the replacement of the 
license fee with a tax or “media fee” to be levied on all citizens, regardless of ownership 
of a transmission device, beginning in 2011. The idea is to reduce the annual contribution 
per citizen, increase the total funding for YLE, and avoid direct government funding to 
maintain YLE’s political independence (Nieminen 2010: 11). YLE has been very pro-active 
in making its news programs available through the internet, with plans to extend its 
regional services online as well (Nieminen 2010: 4), and it has also been expanding its 
multi-cultural programming both online and on television for linguistic minorities as well 
as new immigrant populations (Horsti 2010).
Newspaper subsidies
Public funding has been used since the early 1970s to support Finnish newspapers 
affiliated with political parties to promote “political discourse,” to support non-
newspaper publications “devoted to political and social opinion,” and to selectively aid 
those newspapers in financial distress. In 1999, these subsidies were $16 million (80 
million FIM) (Picard and Gronlund 2003: 112). Additional small subsidies are provided 
to newspapers and electronic publishing in the Swedish, Samí and Romani languages. 
Subsidies have helped keep alive politically oriented newspapers and viewpoints that 
would be marginalized if left only to market forces. In 2008, however, subsidies to party-
9  On the political spectrum, the Social Democrats are left, Coalition Party is right and Centre falls between the two. 
10  The information in this section was also verified by Horsti (2010, personal communication). 
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affiliated newspapers were ended, and by 2009 only direct subsidies to minority language 
publications ($0.7 million) and cultural and opinion journals ($1.4 million), shared by 
about 150 publications, remained (Nieminen 2010: 63). However, all newspapers continue 
to receive significant tax breaks (0 percent VAT sales tax) and delivery subsidies, which 
together amount to more than $400 million per year (ibid.). 
Why It Matters: News Content and Public Knowledge
Curran et al. (2009: 13) find Finnish public television to be “more hard news oriented and 
outward looking than American commercial television,” with 83 percent of all evening 
news programming on YLE classified as hard news, compared with 63 percent in the 
United States. Further, public service television is found to expose a greater diversity of 
individuals to the news. Whereas only 34 percent of low education (up to a high school 
diploma) persons in the United States watch national television news, 73 percent of 
similarly low educated persons do so in Finland; and whereas only 30 percent of low 
income ($24,999 or less annually) watch national news in the United States, 82 percent 
do so in Finland. Building on a study of French and U.S. newspapers (Benson and Hallin 
2007), Väliverronen and Kunelius (2008) show that Finnish newspapers are more likely to 
incorporate civil society viewpoints and provide background historical information than 
the U.S. press.  
FRANCE
Overview
The French public broadcaster, France Télévisions (FTV), operates two primary channels, 
France 2, the national public television station and France 3, the network of regional 
television services.11 Together, the two channels capture 17 percent and 13 percent of 
the viewing audience, respectively (2008 figures). The French-German state-funded 
cultural channel Arte, which offers evening programming only, including a short 
newscast, also competes for a small audience share. The single most watched channel 
is TF1, with 27 percent audience share. Formerly a public station, TF1 was privatized 
in 1987. M6 (launched in 1987) is privately held and captured 13 percent of the 2008 
viewing audience. Canal+ (founded in 1984) operates as a premium channel (with some 
programming only available to subscribers) and had a 3 percent audience share in 2008. 
11  France Télévisions also operates several smaller channels, including the digital-only France 4, France 5 (which 
shares half of the broadcasting day with Arte, the French-German cultural channel), and RFO/Reseau France Outre-
Mer, a network of television and radio channels for overseas French departments. The French public broadcaster 
also has a financial interest in several thematic digital channels. Other publicly-funded media include France 24 
(television) and Radio France Internationale (RFI), internationally-oriented news channels available in both French 
and English,  as well as a host of domestic radio channels including France Inter, France Culture, and France Mu-
sique.
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Funding
Total funding for public broadcasting (including both radio and television) amounted 
to $4.3 billion (€2.75 billion) in 2008. Of that amount, 74 percent is generated through 
public funding and the remainder from commercial advertisements. 
Public funding is provided through a license fee (known as the contribution à l’audiovisuel 
public) and is paid annually with the residence tax (known as the taxe d’habitation) based 
on possession of a television set. Thus, the license fee covers all family members residing 
under the same roof. At present, the license fee amounts to $158 (121€) annually (Bron 
2010; Open Society Institute 2005). 
The overall process of funding public service broadcasting begins in July each year, when 
the budgets for France Télévisions and France Radio are drafted by the government in 
power via both the Ministry of Culture and Communication and the Ministry of Finance. 
The prime minister sets the budget and then, generally in November, sends it on to the 
National Assembly and Senate (Sénat), which approve the final budget and license fee.  
In 2008, President Nicholas Sarkozy announced his intention to end commercial 
advertising as a funding source for France Télévisions. In March 2009, legislation was 
passed that removed advertising from public service television between the hours of 8 
p.m. and 6 a.m. The legislation called for further discussions in 2011 to decide whether 
to extend the ban to hours prior to 8 p.m.; because of political and judicial opposition 
(including from the Conseil d’Etat, as well as complaints filed before the European 
Commission), a “moratorium” on any action to ban daytime advertising has been put in 
place for five years (Berretta 2010; see also Levy 2010). Jean-François Copé, the leader of 
the UMP majority party in the National Assembly and the chair of the commission that 
proposed the specific funding and other changes (see more below), recently stated: “On 
a personal level, I think that this moratorium of five years should be renewed eternally” 
(Berretta 2010; see also Levy 2010).  
Ironically, the ban on advertising was a goal long sought by the left in France as a way to 
make FTV more like the BBC, providing a clear public service alternative to the commercial 
TF1. For example, the Copé commission report notes: “For the new public television, 
[attracting] audiences must be an ambition and not an obsession. New audience measures 
will take into account the quality of the programs as well as audience satisfaction” (Copé 
2008: 7). Sarkozy’s reforms, however, have been generally interpreted as driven by different 
kinds of motivations, notably the desire to strengthen TF1, owned by a close political ally 
of the president, and to weaken public service television by simultaneously cutting its 
budget and increasing its dependence on the state (Levy 2010: 8). Sarkozy nevertheless 
guaranteed to replace public television’s lost advertising funding “euro for euro” with new 
public funding.
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While it is not clear yet that this goal has been accomplished, several new fees and taxes 
are being enacted to at least partially meet the shortfall: 1) a small license fee increase 
(€3), 2) a turnover tax on telecommunications companies and Internet providers initially 
planned at 0.9 percent of turnover but cut in half after intensive industry lobbying against 
it, and 3) a yearly tax of €80 million “on those commercial television companies which it 
was expected would benefit by the end of advertising in peak time on FTV” (Levy 2010: 7).  
Protections of Autonomy and Accountability
French public television has had a long, hard road from being under the thumb of the 
state (as during the de Gaulle years in the 1960s) to achieving a certain measure of 
independence in recent years. By broad consensus, this gradually won autonomy has been 
weakened by unilateral measures taken by President Nicolas Sarkozy beginning in 2008.
There remains a High Council for Broadcasting, or CSA (Conseil superieur de l’audiovisuel), 
which serves in principle as the chief buffer between the government in power and the 
public service broadcasters. Established in 1989, the CSA is led by nine commissioners. 
Three of the commissioners, including the chair, are appointed by the president, three 
by the Senate president, and three by the president of the National Assembly (based on 
the model of the French Supreme Court). While there are no legal prohibitions per se to 
prevent a “packing” of the CSA in the case where a single party controls the presidency, 
Senate, and National Assembly, the actual practice has been to nominate commissioners 
without strong partisan attachments and who possessed needed expertise (Méon 2010, 
personal communication; see also Méon 2003). CSA commissioners serve six-year 
terms with mandates staggered so that one third of the Council leave every two years. 
Additionally, commissioners are legally required to refrain from making public comments 
on positions before the Conseil (CSA 2010). 
The CSA has no authority to set funding levels and is charged primarily with monitoring 
television programming to see that it fulfills its public service obligations, as well as 
providing “youth ratings” for programs similar to the U.S. film ratings (Méon 2003). Prior 
to the Iraq war, the CSA advised journalists to correctly identify sources of information; 
during the war, it issued recommendations regarding the portrayal of prisoners. Similarly, 
the CSA monitors and reports its findings about the amount of news coverage accorded 
to the various political parties to assure a degree of “pluralism and equity” in their 
treatment, especially of the opposition parties in relation to “the executive and the parties 
of the governing majority” (Kuhn 2010b: 11). All recommendations, it should be noted, 
are issued after the broadcast, and the CSA is not legally capable of censoring broadcast 
materials (Open Society Institute 2005; Kuhn 2010a).
In the past, the CSA has appointed the directors of France Télévisions and France Radio. 
These are crucial positions in that the directors have a great deal of discretion in hiring 
personnel and in choosing and scheduling programs. As French media scholar Raymond 
Kuhn (2010b: 11) sums up: “Prior to the start of the Sarkozy presidency the Council has 
 33
PUBLIC MEDIA AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE: Lessons for the Future of Journalism from Around the World
survived alterations in government between left and right over an eighteen year period … 
its existence had constrained the freedom of maneuver of president and government to 
interfere directly in the management of public television.” 
In addition, an Administrative Board is responsible for more direct oversight of France 
Télévisions. The primary task of the board is to oversee the long-term financial planning 
for France Télévisions; an independent external evaluation concluded that the board is 
“hardly involved in daily management” (Open Society Institute 2005: 673). The board has 
14 members, each serving five-year terms, and is composed of two members of parliament 
(one appointed by the National Assembly, the other by the Senate); five civil servants 
appointed by the government in power; five members appointed by the CSA who must be 
“qualified” to serve in the capacity of broadcast regulation; and two members appointed 
by the staff of France Télévisions.
Similar to the Charter Review process in the United Kingdom, FTV periodically negotiates 
“contracts” with the government over its public service rights and responsibilities. In 2007, 
a new contract was agreed upon (Levy 2010: 2). This contractual process has also been 
undermined by President Sarkozy’s recent interventions. Less than a year after the 2007 
contract was finalized, Sarkozy effectively nullified it, calling for the end of all advertising 
on public television and other reforms he deemed necessary (no prior notice had been 
given to CSA or other television officials). He launched a commission, chaired by Copé, 
to undertake a wide-ranging review of FTV. Recommendations of the commission (whose 
opposition party members had quit in protest midway through the process) led to new 
legislation passed in March 2009. In addition to dramatic changes in funding, by far the 
most important additional “reform” is shifting the power to name the director of FTV 
and France Radio. Previously, as noted, the CSA held this prerogative; henceforth, the 
president will make these five-year appointments (coinciding with the president’s term 
of office) directly, with consultation with the CSA and in agreement with parliamentary 
commissions (requiring a 3/5 majority). However, “most commentators saw these 
[limitations] as little more than window dressings in a futile attempt to mask a dramatic 
increase in presidential direct control of FTV” (Levy 2010: 8). In general, the CSA was 
sidelined and did not play a major role during the Copé commission proceedings.
Resistance on the part of French public television has not disappeared entirely. Sarkozy’s 
push to eliminate all advertising for France Télévisions has been delayed in part because of 
the opposition of FTV staff and administration, including former CEO/director Patrick de 
Carolis, who as a result was not reappointed to the post (Psenny 2010).  
 34
PUBLIC MEDIA AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE: Lessons for the Future of Journalism from Around the World
Transition to the Internet
According to several observers, French public service broadcasters’ “online presence is 
underdeveloped compared to that of the BBC” (Kuhn 2010b: 1; see also Levy 2010: 3). 
Given the current French preoccupation with questions of control, direction, and funding 
of public television, questions of how it will adapt to the online environment have not 
been central.   
Notably, however, the French government justified its tax on telecommunications 
companies to help make up the shortfall in decreased advertising funding for FTV by 
arguing that “convergence means a wider range of operators benefit from, and hence 
should contribute to, the costs of public service content” (Levy 2010: 12). The Copé 
commission report (Copé 2008: 40) also explicitly exempted the FTV Internet sites from 
any ban on advertising. 
Newspaper subsidies
Press subsidies now make up about 13 percent of total French newspaper revenues, 
reportedly the highest percentage in Western Europe (Mathien 2003: 146). At first, general 
subsidies were made available to all newspapers in the form of reduced postal rates, 
distribution aid, and preferential tax rates to journalists as individuals (Charon 2005). 
Beginning in the early 1970s, additional small direct subsidies were provided to politically 
oriented newspapers with low advertising receipts and circulation that provide “ideological 
diversity.” These subsidies are content neutral and have been granted to newspapers 
from the far-right to the far-left, including the Front National-linked Présent, left-leaning 
Libération, the Catholic La Croix, and the communist L’Humanité (Albert 2004: 105). 
Press subsidies have been paid for at least in part by “a national tax on public and private 
television advertising revenue” (Dennis 2004: 11). 
After a lengthy process of consultation with publishers, journalists, and concerned publics 
(“Etats généraux de la presse écrite “) during the fall of 2008, the French government 
announced additional measures totaling $946.7 million (€600 million) over three years 
beginning in 2009 to help newspapers during the current economic crisis, including: a 
“ninefold” increase in funding for home delivery of newspapers (from €8 million to €70 
million, about $100 million), reductions in taxes, free weekly newspaper subscriptions 
to 18-24 year olds (given by publishers, with the state paying for delivery), and grants 
(€20 million, or $28.2 million) to support online-only news operations as well as to help 
newspapers improve and expand their websites (Wauters 2009; see also Etats généraux de 
la presse écrite 2009 and Pirot 2009). 
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Why It Matters: News Content and Public Knowledge
Research on French media shows that public service broadcasters provide a wide range of 
coverage addressing issues of public relevance. Public channels, for instance, regularly air 
political shows that cannot be found on the channels of commercial broadcasters. These 
have included 100 minutes pour convaincre (100 minutes to convince) on France 2 and 
France Europe Express on France 3 (Open Society Institute 2005). Holtz-Bacha et al. (1994) 
show that broadcast election coverage in France tends to focus more on logical appeals, 
whereas comparable U.S. election coverage focused more heavily on emotional appeals. 
In a comparative study of election news coverage by national private and public television 
channels in Germany, U.K., and France, and national private channels in the United States, 
Esser (2008: 412, 416, 422-425) found “more extensive [election] coverage on public than 
commercial channels” in all of the European countries. He also reports that French public 
channel France 2’s coverage was the most likely to focus on policy substance. 
Leidenberger (2010) compares public and commercial television news in Germany and 
France and finds that the public news in both countries is more focused on politics than 
the commercial channels. He also reports, however, that French public (France 2) and 
commercial (TF1) news are very similar on a number of dimensions, including their focus 
on sensational news (catastrophes, disasters, and delinquency, etc.), which he attributes 
to France 2’s reliance on advertising and market pressures to imitate its commercial 
competitor. Presumably, in the future, a less-advertising-reliant France 2 might differentiate 
itself to a greater degree from TF1. Benson’s (2009a) case study of immigration news 
coverage likewise found France 2 and TF1 to be similar in many respects (length of 
news segments and sound bites, diversity of voices and viewpoints, proportion of news 
generated by the political field, etc.), but showed that France 2 — as well as the German-
French entirely publicly funded Arte — was more likely to be critical of the government 
and the majority party than TF1.  
Research comparing French and U.S. newspapers both offline (Benson and Hallin 2007;  
Benson 2009b, 2010) and online (Benson, Orsten, Powers, Willig, and Vera  2010) has 
found the French press to be both more internally and externally pluralist, just as or more 
critical of the major political parties and government, and more likely to make room 
for in-depth debate and analysis of issues. French newspapers receiving direct subsidies 
such as La Croix or L’Humanité were just as ideologically diverse and critical as American 
newspapers as well as other French newspapers (Benson 2009b, 2010).  
GERMANY
Overview
German public broadcasting comprises two basic elements. The older ARD was created 
in 1950 as a network of regional broadcasters and today captures 27 percent of the total 
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audience. The national broadcaster ZDF was set up in 1961; it holds 13 percent of the daily 
audience share. These two public broadcasters compete primarily with four commercial 
broadcasters: RTL (18 percent audience share, distributed through cable), Sat.1 (10 
percent), ProSieben (7 percent) and Vox (5 percent). 
As a network of regional broadcasters, ARD is responsible for producing “Das Erste,” 
the so-called first channel that broadcasts nationwide. This channel does not vary from 
one region to another. But ARD also produces the Dritte Programme, the so-called third 
channels, which are regionally produced and vary from state to state. ZDF, by contrast, 
provides strictly national programming (Libertus 2004: 8). 
Funding
In 2008, total combined revenues for ARD and ZDF were $12.5 billion (roughly €8 
billion), making it the largest public broadcasting system in Europe. ARD is the larger 
of the two, with $9.5 billion (€6 billion) in total 2008 revenues. Of that number, 86 
percent was provided through license fees. In the same year, ZDF brought in $3 billion 
(€1.9 billion), also with 86 percent from license fees.12 The remaining funding comes 
from advertising, sponsorships and program sales. No advertisements are allowed after 
8 p.m. or on Sundays (van Dijk, Nahuis, and Waagmeester 2006: 6; Wessler 2010, personal 
communication). 
As of 2009, the annual license fee was $279 and was required to be paid for each television 
in the household (though this rule is not always actively enforced, and some very low-
income households are exempted from paying any fee). The fee is set every two years by 
an independent commission, the KEF (which means literally the “Commission for the 
Determination of the Financial Needs of Broadcasters”), based on the budgetary plans of 
the public broadcasters and is then sent to the Lander parliaments (German states, which 
have sole responsibility for culture and media) for approval. In 2010, the prime ministers 
of the Lander announced that funding would be changed to a household payment, 
irrespective of the presence or absence of a television, beginning in 2013 (Krieger 2010).
Protections of Autonomy and Accountability
The combination of a strong constitutional principle of non-interference of the state in 
broadcasting and a federal political structure provide journalists at both ARD and ZDF 
with ample autonomy from any direct political interference (Humphreys 1996; Williams 
1976; van Dijk et al. 2006).
Per order of the German Constitutional Court, the central political executive has no 
authority to set funding levels (Humphreys 1996: 137-138). Founded in 1975 and granted 
a constitutional mandate in 1994 by the Constitutional Court to determine the license 
12  Article 13 of the Inter-State Broadcasting Agreement mandates that “the primary source of income is the broad-
casting license fee” (Bron 2010: 11). 
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fee, the KEF consists of 16 members (one for each German “Land”) (KEF 2010). Each 
Land appoints one expert from a given field (it is pre-arranged for each Land what field 
the expert must come from, chiefly, law, academia, business, politics, and media). Then 
the 16 Land Premiers decide together on all 16 KEF members (Wegner 2010, personal 
communication; see also Holtz-Bacha 2002). Land legislators can only examine whether 
the financial needs of the broadcasters have been established accurately and in accordance 
with norms of economic efficiency (Bron 2010).
Typically, the recommendation of the KEF is put forward into law through an inter-state 
agreement between the various Lander, whereupon the duty of fee collection falls to the 
GEZ, a joint body of the ARD and ZDF (Bron 2010). Thus the decision made by KEF is 
generally approved pro forma. However, in 2004 a number of Lander governments for the 
first time refused the KEF’s proposed license fee hike and the issue was taken to the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany, which ruled in favor of the public broadcasters that the 
“politically motivated handling of the license fee issue by the Lander had been a violation 
of the principle of broadcasting freedom” (Woldt 2010: 178). The court’s argument was 
that when the political field begins determining the funding of public broadcasting, it 
constitutes an illegal influence that detrimentally impacts public broadcasting functions. 
Such a maneuver would mean that public broadcasters would  “no longer be availing 
themselves of a freedom, but merely be executing predetermined programmes” (Karstens 
2007; Meier 2006, 2007; Sumrada and Nohlen 2005).
German public service broadcasters are overseen internally by Broadcasting Councils, 
made up of nine members serving four-year terms. The councils (sometimes called 
governing councils) are found at each public broadcaster (Humphreys 1996: 134) and 
are responsible for electing public broadcasting directors, advising on program design, 
monitoring compliance with program standards and approving the budget and annual 
report. Broadcasting councils are responsible for setting out the general programming 
guidelines for the public service broadcaster (e.g. the mixture of scheduled programs), 
consistent with the public service mandate established via treaty among all the 
regional Lander governments that programming should be comprehensive, including 
entertainment as well as news, and that there should be a plurality of opinion (van Dijk 
et al. 2006: 6). Council members typically are representatives of political parties, unions, 
trade and industry groups, churches, universities and cultural institutions. In the past, 
many members have had allegiances to particular parties. Due to the federal nature of 
the broadcasting system, though, it has been difficult for any one party to influence 
programming decisions, leading Humphreys (1996: 153) to write that “no single party 
ever enjoyed undue influence over the entire public-service broadcasting system.”
Administrative Councils are responsible for overseeing the financial activities of public 
service broadcasters (at ARD, each regional member station has its own Administrative 
Council; the centralized ZDF has only one council) (Wessler 2011, personal 
communication). Members are appointed by the relevant Broadcasting Council and thus 
tend to represent a variety of distinct social groups. Administrative Councils have 14 
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members, appointed for five-year terms. Five members are representatives of the Lander, 
one represents the ruling federal government and eight members are elected by the 
Broadcasting Council. Tasks include budget control and approval of the director general’s 
appointment of upper-level management (Eberle 2002). In 2010, the Administrative 
Council’s authority to approve upper-level management positions led to problems that 
were hotly debated. The ZDF Administrative Council, dominated by CDU (conservative) 
representatives and their allies, refused to extend the contract of ZDF’s news and 
information programming editor-in-chief Nikolaus Brender. Brender was replaced. But 
there was a public outcry, and there is a debate in media stakeholder circles currently as to 
whether regulations should be changed to diminish the direct influence of party officials 
on personnel appointments. For instance, some legal experts believe that the current 
practice of allowing Land Premiers to serve on the Administrative Council is a violation of 
the German Constitution (Wessler 2010, personal communication). 
Transition to the Internet
New public broadcasting services must be approved by the Broadcasting Councils 
following a “three-step” test. This test states that the Council must find that the new service 
(1) meets democratic, social and cultural needs of society; (2) contributes positively to 
editorial quality; (3) and has costs that are proportional to the expected benefits. Decisions 
taken by the Broadcasting Council are then reviewed by the court (Holznagel and Jansen 
2010). Compared to the U.K., Germany’s public broadcasters have been more legally 
constrained in their efforts to expand online due largely to opposition from commercial 
media; since 2003, ARD and ZDF have limited themselves to spending no more than 0.75  
percent of their total budgets for online services (Humphreys 2010). 
Why It Matters: News Content and Public Knowledge
Recent scholarship shows that ARD and ZDF carry significantly more original news 
programming than commercial broadcasters, which tend to focus more on entertainment 
programming. Woldt (2010) finds nearly 10 percent of all public programming to 
be original news reporting. By contrast, the amount of news coming from the main 
commercial stations, RTL, Sat.1 and ProSieben, ranges from 1 percent to 4 percent. 
Comparing the news programs of public and commercial stations, Woldt also finds that 
commercial stations devote much higher percentages of their news coverage to accident/
disaster, crime and human-interest stories. ARD and ZDF, for instance, devote 48 and 38 
percent, respectively, of their news coverage to political news, whereas RTL and Sat.1 (the 
commercial broadcasters) devote only 18 and 27 percent, respectively, to these topics. New 
research by German communication scholar Hartmut Wessler shows that news on ARD 
is more in-depth and more “deliberative” on several important dimensions (e.g., share of 
political content, dialogic engagement of opposing viewpoints, justification of positions 
by speakers, meta-communication about the rules and conduct of public debate) than the 
commercial channels RTL and n-tv (a commercial news-only channel) (Rinke and Wessler 
2010; see also Wessler 2008). 
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IRELAND
Overview
Television in Ireland is characterized by a strong public broadcaster and the strong 
presence of British television channels. The public broadcaster, RTE (Raidió Teilifís 
Éireann, founded in 1960), broadcasts mainly on two channels, RTE 1 and RTE 2, for a 
combined 2008 audience share of 36.5 percent (25 percent RTE 1, 11.5 percent RTE 2). 
The commercial channel TV3 (founded in 1998) captured 11.4 percent audience share. 
The primary British channels are BBC (8.5 percent audience share), UTV (4.4 percent) and 
Channel 4 (3.7 percent). 
Funding
Total funding for RTE in 2008 was $695.4 million (€440.8 million), with 45.6 percent 
from public funds and the remainder generated from commercial revenues, especially 
advertising. 
The current license fee is $208.59 (160€) per household (RTE 2010) and is set annually by 
the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland, as stipulated in Section 124 of the Broadcasting Act 
(Ireland Broadcasting Act 2009). The Authority must follow a formula in setting the license 
fee (calculated as the change in the national consumer price index plus 1 percentage 
point minus the adjustment recommended by the Authority). Funds are issued to RTE 
by the Ministry of Communications, with the approval of the Finance Ministry (Ireland 
Broadcasting Act 2009; RTE 2010; Bron 2010). 
Protections of Autonomy and Accountability
The Broadcasting Authority of Ireland (created in 2009, replacing the Independent Radio 
and Television Commission) is responsible for ensuring that broadcasters, both public and 
private, provide programming that can “best serve the needs of the people of the island 
of Ireland, bearing in mind their languages and traditions and their religious, ethical and 
cultural diversity” (BAI 2010). It comprises nine members, with five appointed by the 
minister of culture and four appointed following their nomination by a parliamentary 
committee with a focus on communications issues. Terms last five years, with the possibility 
of one reappointment. Board members elect a chair from among their members to serve a 
single five-year term (BAI 2010; Ireland Broadcasting Act 2009). Criteria for appointment 
include experience or capacity in one or more of the following areas: media industry, 
trade union affairs, business or commercial affairs, arts and culture, law and education. 
Appointees may not hold employment or interest in broadcasting or newspaper publishing.
The governing board of the RTE serves as a buffer between parliament and RTE. It 
elects the director-general of RTE and monitors the broadcaster’s finances. The board is 
comprised of 12 members: the minister of communication appoints six, the parliamentary 
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committee on communication chooses four (who are then brought to the minister for 
official appointment), and RTE staff elect one. The director-general is the 12th member, 
serving ex-officio. Terms are for five years (section 81, Ireland Broadcasting Act 2009) 
and are not staggered by law, though some staggering tends to occur. Some members are 
reappointed, while others resign prior to serving their full five-year terms (Kelly 2010, 
personal communication). Day-to-day management of RTE is handled by an executive 
board, which is comprised of six members, including the director-general. 
Transition to the Internet
RTE Online is commercially funded and is under the purview of RTE Publishing (RTE 
2006; Silicon Republic 2010). Online activities are described as a “visual version” of 
traditional public programming. RTE.ie ranks first among Irish media sites with a monthly 
reach of 18.3 percent of the adult Internet population (RTE 2009).
JAPAN
Overview
Founded in 1925 as a radio service modeled on Britain’s BBC, NHK expanded to include 
television in 1953 (NHK Profile 2010). NHK now has two main domestic terrestrial 
television channels (one generalist, the other educational) which together had an 
audience share of 17 percent in 2007 (Nakamura 2009), a significant decline from 
its audiences during the 1980s (Krauss 2000). In addition to its two radio channels, 
NHK also operates one high-definition and two satellite television channels. Its main 
commercial competition comes from Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS), Nippon 
Television (NTV), Fuji Television (CX), TV Asahi (ANN), and the local TV Tokyo (TN), all 
of which enjoy close ties to influential national newspapers. Altogether, the NHK group is 
larger than all these commercial companies combined, in terms of annual budget and the 
number of employees.
Funding
NHK revenues are obtained from license fees (called “reception” or “receiving” fees) and 
were $6.9 billion (662 billion yen) in 2009 (NHK 2010). Yearly budget and reception fee 
increases are subject to approval by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
and the National Diet (Parliament). In 2010, the receiving fee for a 12-month advance 
contract was $168.29 for terrestrial service and $288.61 for satellite service (14,910 and 
25,570 yen, respectively) (NHK 2009).
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Protections of Autonomy and Accountability
NHK’s Board of Governors consists of 12 members who are appointed by the prime 
minister (with consent of both Houses of the Diet) to serve three-year terms (Krauss 
2000). The Board is the decision-making body charged with matters that include policy, 
operation and budgeting for the network (NHK Profile 2010). The prime minister is to 
appoint or reappoint members who are “well informed and experienced,” which is to say 
they are to represent the fields of education, culture, science and industry. Directors may 
not be government officials or staff members for any political party, and no more than 
four should belong to the same political party. A presiding chair is elected from among the 
12 members (Krauss 2000: 103). 
The Executive Board, separate from the Board of Governors, is comprised of the president, 
the vice president and nine managing directors (NHK Profile 2010). The president serves a 
three-year tenure with the possibility of reappointment (Krauss 2000: 103). A third entity, 
an Audit Committee, exists as a check on both the Board of Governors and the Executive 
Board. Consisting of three or more members, the Audit Committee audits all business 
done by the Board of Governors and the Executive Board. However, while the NHK 
claims that the committee exists independently of the two Boards, the Audit Committee 
is appointed by the Board of Governors and reports to the Board of Governors (NHK 
Profile 2010). The government has no control over the daily administration of the NHK. 
Ultimately, governance of the NHK is autonomous from but still accountable to the state 
(Krauss 2000: 103). 
Transition to the Internet
In 2000, NHK World began to offer broadcast content online, primarily news and 
educational programming (Krauss 2005), but expansion has been hampered by declines 
in license-fee revenues due to increasing numbers of viewers not paying. NHK’s latest 
corporate plan (NHK 2009) calls for increasing the receiving fee payment rate from 71 
percent to 78 percent over five years, by increasing audience satisfaction through more 
diverse programming and by beefing up historically lax enforcement of receiver-fee 
contracts. 
Why It Matters: News Content and Public Knowledge
Although Japan’s Broadcast Law prohibits “political interference in programming content” 
(Krauss 2005: 10), Japanese politicians have periodically been accused of attempting 
to exert influence on NHK news. The most notorious example was when part of a 2001 
program on “Comfort Women” was allegedly edited out (the portion linking Emperor 
Hirohito to the World War II policy of “sexually enslaving women for the Japanese 
military”) in response to political pressure. Allegations surfaced in a January 2005 article 
in the leading Asahi Shinbun newspaper and prompted strict denials on the part of NHK 
and government politicians (Pulvers 2006; Krauss 2005: 10). Whether or not the incident 
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occurred, it demonstrated  NHK’s continuing vulnerability to political interference given its 
reliance on annual funding decisions by the government and the Diet (Krauss 2005: 12); 
more positively, the brouhaha accompanying the revelations demonstrated the persistence 
of journalistic and public expectations that such partisan influence is not proper. In 2006, 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications ordered NHK to broadcast shortwave 
information about “abductions of Japanese nationals by North Korea,” but NHK’s 
executive director resisted the directive, saying: “We base our choice of programs on our 
own judgment, from the point of view of journalism” (Pulvers 2006). 
UC-San Diego political scientist Ellis Krauss’ (2000: 33) content analysis of NHK finds “no 
consistent bias in [the] extent of coverage in favor of the governing party or the opposition 
parties”; furthermore, he finds that NHK was the only Japanese television network to 
cover all political parties. In comparison to television news in the United States and other 
western democracies, Krauss (2005: 13) identifies one of the chief characteristics of the 
NHK to be its “tendency to broadcast more news about the bureaucracy in a factual, non-
exciting, non-visual way.” 
THE NETHERLANDS
Overview
Three players are dominant in the national Dutch television industry: the Netherlands 
Public Broadcasting (or NPO, founded in 1919, and nowadays including Ned 1, Ned 2 and 
Ned 313), the RTL Nederland group (RTL 4, RTL 5, RTL 7, RTL 8, and RTL Lounge) and SBS 
Broadcasting (which was taken over in 2007 by the German group ProSiebenSat.1 Media 
(channel 5, SBS 6 and Veronica). Ned 1 has the highest audience share, with 21 percent 
in 2008.14 The primary commercial competitors, RTL 4 and SBS 6, are behind with 13 
percent and 11 percent audience shares, respectively. The two other public channels (Ned 
2 and Ned 3) each have a daily share of about 7 percent. The percentage for the other 
commercial channels (Net 5, RTL 5, RTL 7, Veronica) are between 3 percent and 5 percent. 
The Dutch public system is often described as “pillarized” (Hoffman Riem 1996; Hallin 
and Mancini 2004), meaning that it is organized and run not by a single professional 
broadcaster but by various segments or “pillars” (along religious and political 
denominations) of society. Currently, the main body of the public broadcasting system 
consists of 11 national broadcasting associations.15 No broadcaster has its own station; 
13  Ned 1 broadcasts primarily news and sports; Ned 2 concentrates on arts and culture, with some politics and 
news coverage; Ned 3 is oriented toward youth. 
14  In contrast to the trend in many other European countries, its audience share has actually increased over the past 
few years, up from 12 percent in 2005 (European Audiovisual Observatory 2009). 
15  The associations are: AVRO (General Radio Broadcasting Association), the oldest broadcasting group, originally 
intended for a right-wing secular audience though now intended for a broader audience; BNN (Bart’s News Net-
work), named after a Dutch celebrity who died in 2002, this association aims programming at youth, particularly 
teenagers, and produces a fair amount of pop culture programming; KRO (Catholic Broadcasting), one of the oldest 
associations, though currently its programming tends to be secular and left-of-center politically;  EO (Evangeli-
cal Broadcasting), which promotes evangelical materials; VARA (United Radio Workers Amateur), an association 
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rather, to simplify a very complex process, NPO allocates time on the three national 
channels (Ned 1, 2, 3) and six radio stations to each broadcaster (as detailed below). In 
spite of the pillarized system, publicly funded news is produced by NOS, a collaborative 
undertaking of the various member broadcasters (Magder 2011, personal communication).
Funding
In 2000, the Netherlands public broadcasting system shifted its primary mode of funding 
from license fees to annual state subsidies. In 2007, public funds accounted for 68 percent 
($822.3 million) of total NPO revenues ($1.2 billion; €893.3 million). The remaining 
revenues are drawn from advertising and “self-generated funds,” such as member 
contributions and publication of program guides (Bron 2010: 15). 
The Ministry of Education, Culture and Science sets NPO’s budget annually (Bron 2010). 
The budget for each national broadcaster is distributed in turn by NPO after approval of 
the fee by the parliament.
NPO allocates time on the three national channels (Ned 1, 2, 3) to the various 
broadcasters on the basis of the size of their membership and their capacity to add value to 
the public broadcasting system. The size of membership has historically been determined 
largely by sales of program guides (similar to TV Guide), sold by each of the broadcasters, 
with each sale counting as a single member; to ensure accuracy in membership figures, the 
private sale of weekly or monthly program guides violates Dutch broadcasting law (Magder 
2011, personal communication). However, this method may now be changed as a variety 
of new, small social, religious and ethnic broadcasting associations enter the field (Van 
Vree 2010, personal communication). NPO has discretionary capacity of 50 percent of 
broadcast time to decide what programming is needed. Bardoel (2008: 211) writes that this 
is intended to “allow external plurality to develop in line with the dynamics of present-day 
society, while at the same time securing enough innovation and professionalism.” 
Protections of Autonomy and Accountability
The “Commission for the Media” (Commissariaat voor de Media) oversees all broadcasters 
and ensures that they live up to their obligations as defined in the Media Act (updated 
in 2008). In this capacity, the commission decides which associations and organizations 
will be incorporated into the Public Media system (Commissariaat voor de Media 
2010). To receive time and funding, generally associations must have a minimum of 
50,000 to 300,000 members (depending on the type of license accorded) and must 
agree to broadcast certain amounts of news and information (Bakker and Vasterman 
with a left-of-center, labor orientation; NCRV (Dutch Christian Radio Association), the primary mainline Protestant 
association, which produces largely secular, slightly left-of-center programming; LLINK, an association focused 
on environmental and human rights concerns; MAX, an association aimed at viewers over the age of fifty; TROS 
(Television Radio Broadcasting Foundation), one of the oldest and most popular, with an emphasis on entertain-
ment programs; VPRO (Liberal Protestant Radio Broadcasting), a liberal Protestant association with a reputation for 
high-quality cultural programming (NPO 2010). 
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2010). In addition, the agency STER (Stichting Ether Reklame – Foundation for Broadcast 
Advertising) ensures that advertisers have no undue influence on programs (STER 2010; 
Bardoel 2008). Every five years, an Inspection Commission (Visitatiecommissie) evaluates 
and measures the performance of the national public broadcasters. This commission 
consists of eight independent experts drawn from the fields of business management and 
academia who have special expertise in media. Their findings and recommendations are 
made available to NPO (NPO 2010).
Internally, the NPO is responsible for overseeing the distribution of audio-visual content 
on the public channels and ensures cooperation among the various national broadcasting 
associations. It is headed by a seven-member Supervisory Board (NPO 2010).  
Transition to the Internet
Funding for NPO digital initiatives has been a topic of debate since at least 2002, 
when commercial broadcasters first raised questions. In January of 2010, the European 
Commission broadly approved the current process for funding online services, in which 
the Ministry of Education, Culture and Society conducts value tests (to establish the need 
for any new service balanced against effects on commercial media) prior to approval of a 
new service. 
Omroep.nl is the main portal for all public broadcasting (providing access to all programs 
from all broadcasting associations, though most associations also have their own web 
portals as well), and Nos.nl is the primary news site. Funding is from a mixture of public 
revenues and advertising. A video-on-demand service launched in 2009 enabling content 
to be available online 10 minutes after broadcast is expected to generate additional 
revenues.
Newspaper subsidies
Beginning in the early 1970s, the Netherlands moved from an “inactive” press policy 
(legal protections against censorship) to a more “active” press policy that involved a 
“duty of care” to promote and enhance media diversity (Lichtenberg 2006: 108). The 
Netherlands “Press Fund” was established for such purposes in 1971 and was financed 
by a tax of 4 percent on public service and commercial television advertising (Dennis 
2004: 12). Funding decisions are made on an annual basis by the Ministry of Culture. The 
Press Fund’s board members, who may not be employed either by a government ministry 
or a publishing company, are appointed by royal decree on the recommendation of the 
minister of culture. 
Newspapers receiving subsidies (in either the form of loans or grants) must be focused 
on news with “a view to political opinion-forming”; must be edited by an independent 
editing team; must be available for purchase (making “free” papers ineligible); and must 
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be facing severe financial difficulties threatening their “continued existence” and unable to 
find support elsewhere (Lichtenberg 2006: 110).
Between 1972 and 2005, the Press Fund distributed a total of $77 million (€55 million) 
in grants and $19 million (€14 million) in loans to newspapers (2005 exchange rates). 
After a targeted “temporary compensation measure” for distressed secondary newspapers 
was ended in 1990, the share of newspaper circulation controlled by the three largest 
corporations increased from 45 percent to 90 percent due to mergers and takeovers 
(Lichtenberg 2006: 111-112). In 2007, the Press Fund changed its policy, aiming to more 
actively support research and innovation; in 2009, this policy was supported by the 
Ministry of Culture, which raised the Press Fund’s budget to €8 million with provisions 
to fund experiments in cross-platform and multimedia journalism as well as research on 
journalism quality. The government also allocated new funds to help both national and 
local newspapers hire new young journalists for two year periods (up to 60 journalists in 
total) (Van Vree 2010, personal communication).  
NEW ZEALAND
Overview
New Zealand’s recent history in some ways offers a cautionary tale of how not to structure 
and fund public media. After struggling since its inception in 1960 to receive consistent, 
adequate public support, TVNZ (the public broadcaster) was in 1989 stripped of nearly 
all its public service obligations and public funding, relying almost entirely on advertising 
and expected to produce dividends to be returned to the national treasury. In its place came 
New Zealand on the Air (NZoA), a public media agency rather than broadcaster (Dunleavy 
2010a: 298) that is one and the same as the Broadcasting Commission (see below). NZoA’s 
statutory mission is to disburse public funds for the creation of programs, which are then 
sold via competitive bidding to TVNZ or private commercial channels. Radio New Zealand, 
though, has remained noncommercial and entirely publicly funded.
In 2002, TVNZ’s public service mission was restored via a new charter formalized in the 
Television New Zealand Act of 2003 (Dunleavy 2010b: 3). The new public service charter 
emphasized four purposes: “the role of building community and citizenship capacity, 
the call for quality and integrity, the role of nurturing the creative industries and pushing 
creative boundaries, and the provision for a wide range of interests with a special emphasis 
on neglected minority interests” (ibid.). Though well-intentioned, this revival of TVNZ’s 
public service mandate ultimately failed because it was only supported with minimal 
public funding ($12-$15 million per year) and because the channel was never relieved 
of a simultaneous demand to be commercially profitable (ibid.: 5; see also Comrie and 
Fountaine 2005). A new conservative National Party government, elected in 2009, has 
signaled its intention to “scrap” the charter and move all public funds to NZoA, though 
this policy has not yet been officially legislated (see Thompson 2009).
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Funding
For 10 years after its founding in 1989, New Zealand On Air was funded by a license fee. 
In 1999, the government shifted to annual parliamentary appropriations. Don Hunn, 
a former chairman of NZoA, believes the change compromised the agency’s autonomy: 
“In the public broadcasting fee era [from 1989 to 1999], NZ on Air was, if you like, more 
independent from government. Independent may not be exactly the right term, but what 
I mean is there was little or no political involvement” (Hunn 2004). In 2008, NZoA and 
TVNZ received about $126.5 million total in public funding, representing 38.5 percent of 
total funding; the remaining 61.5 percent of funding ($202.4 million) was commercially 
generated. Because funding is so low and appropriated on an annual basis, New Zealand 
on Air is generally only able to help support rather than fully fund productions (Hunn 
2004; Dunleavy 2010b), ultimately watering down the public service orientation of the 
programming it sponsors. 
Protections of Autonomy and Accountability
In 1989, the newly-created New Zealand Broadcasting Commission renamed itself “New 
Zealand on Air.” It has a six-person board, appointed by the Ministry of Broadcasting. 
Terms last five years. This board develops a set of criteria used by NZoA in deciding which 
projects receive support: the two primary components have to do with localism and 
diversity of content. In principle, both the executive and parliament are legally prohibited 
from intervening in the commission’s decisions (Debrett 2004). However, as noted, 
funding scarcity and insecurity have compromised NZoA’s public service mission.
According to New Zealand media policy scholar Trisha Dunleavy, “There is no 
organization overseeing TVNZ … and has not been since 1988.” Dunleavy adds that the 
“complete absence of any independent body between broadcasting and government … 
leaves TV at the mercy of governments and that really is a big problem because different 
governments have vastly different ideas about its worth. Hence we chop and change with 
every new political regime” (Dunleavy 2010, personal communication; also Comrie 2010, 
personal communication).
On the other hand, as a public agency, NZoA’s capacity to control programming is also 
limited. As Dunleavy explains, “NZoA is a funder not a producer. … Its money is allocated 
directly to producers so that they can do this work. This is how NZoA remains at some 
distance from [commercial] networks; it liaises with producers who in their turn liaise 
with the networks. Although it can certainly influence what is commissioned by networks, 
NzoA cannot influence decisions about the actual broadcast time-slot of this material. It 
also holds no editorial control after the money has been handed over to the producers” 
(Dunleavy 2010, ibid.).    
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Why It Matters: News Content and Public Knowledge
During the long period from the mid-1970s through the 1990s as TVNZ was subject to 
increasing deregulation and commercialization, research has shown that TVNZ news 
adopted an increasingly sensational, tabloid style of journalism (Comrie and Fountaine 
2005). 
In order to be able to pay profit dividends to the national treasury (about $30 million 
per year), TVNZ’s current non-commercial programming has mostly been relegated to 
Sunday mornings and two new entirely noncommercial digital channels, TVNZ 6 and 
7 (Thompson 2009). But even this will probably end if the current government carries 
through with its promise to end public funding. 
Despite problems with implementation and funding, there is ample evidence that TVNZ 
programming improved during the brief interlude (especially 2003-2008) of the public 
service charter, increasing the amount of “local” programming and creating new public 
affairs programs such as Face to Face, Agenda, and Eye to Eye. As New Zealand media 
policy scholar Peter Thompson (2009) comments, “The Charter remains significant 
because it specifies a set of broadcasting principles and goals in an otherwise normatively 
rudderless commercial environment, in which transitory ratings and revenues are the 
only operational goals. Even placing a half-hearted public service operator within the 
ecology can have an ‘anchoring’ influence by making other broadcasters reflect on their 
own performance and motivating them to uphold some semblance of social responsibility 
beyond their own commercial self-interest.” 
While the public service programmer New Zealand on Air has “made possible a range 
of good quality local programmes, there is a propensity for these to be concentrated on 
genres/formats that can be most easily accommodated in a commercial schedule relegated 
to peripheral slots in the schedule or else rejected by the schedulers” (Thompson 2009). 
In other words, since NZoA has no control over where and how its programs are placed, it 
has every incentive to produce for market demands and virtually no incentive to produce 
noncommercial alternatives that nevertheless could add significantly to content diversity; 
on the other hand, Dunleavy (2010, personal communication) notes that audience 
research has shown that viewers “are extremely pleased … with what NZoA funds.” 
Despite inconsistent policies and uneven, generally low funding, concerned citizens and 
public media professionals have nevertheless struggled mightily to create noncommercial 
alternatives. For example, in 2004, a public Maori Television channel was launched with 
the goal of revitalizing the indigenous Maori culture while at the same time informing, 
educating, and entertaining a “broad viewing audience” (Smith and Abel 2008: 5). The 
channel has its own board of directors and is advised by a Maori Elders Council. Its main 
intent “is to ‘zig’ where other channels ‘zag,’ ” with one example being the start of “current 
affairs show Native Affairs at a time when the news media [in New Zealand] are under 
severe threat” (ibid.).
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NORWAY
Overview
In Norway, the public broadcaster is the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK), 
which operates three national and 10 regional channels (Vaagan 2008). Begun in 1933, 
its total audience share in 2008 was 32 percent. Its closest competitor is the private TV2 
(founded in 1992), with a 25 percent audience share. Other private channels include 
TVNorge (owned by ProSiebenSat.1, begun in 1988) and TV3 (owned by Modern Times 
Group, founded in 1987) (Østbye 2010; Lund and Berg 2009; Vaagan 2008). 
Funding
Total 2007 NRK revenues were $670.5 million (€495.3 million), nearly all (95  percent) 
derived from license fees. The remaining revenues are generated through a combination 
of sponsorships, advertisements, program sales, and spin-off products (NRK 2010a). By 
law, commercial activities must be maintained separately from public service activities. In 
practice, this means that commercial activities are handled by a subsidiary, commercial 
arm of NRK, established in 1997 and called NRK Aktivum (Roppen 2008).
In 2009, the license fee per household was $392 (NRK 2010a). Norway’s Parliament, 
the Storting, sets the fee annually (Noam 1991; Radio and Television Board of Denmark 
2004). There are ongoing discussions of whether to scrap the license fee and replace it with 
direct state budget finance (Vaagan 2008). The fee is collected by NRK itself. 
Protections of Autonomy and Accountability
NRK’s Articles of Association (NRK 2010b), which provides the legal basis for the public 
broadcaster, guarantee editorial independence both from political and commercial 
intrusion. The Articles stipulate that the NRK be able to “operate free and independently 
in relation to persons or groups that, for political, ideological, economic or other reasons, 
wish to exert influence on its editorial content.”  This legal framework helps explain how 
NRK has been able to combine “strong governmental influence at the structural level …
with a high level of autonomy in programming” (Roppen 2008: 80). 
Externally, the Norwegian Media Authority (NMA) serves as a buffer between government 
and all Norwegian broadcasters. This independent regulatory body ensures that NRK 
follows the obligations stated in the Broadcasting Act. A central function of the NMA is to 
ensure that NRK follows its obligations regarding appropriate levels of news and current 
affairs programming, as well as content for children. Each year NRK submits a public 
broadcasting report to the NMA (NRK’s bylaws, article 11). The NMA then delivers its views 
on this report to the Ministry of Culture. However, neither the Ministry nor the NMA has 
legal authority to interfere in the programming and production decisions of journalists at 
NRK (Thorbjornsrud and Beyer 2010 and 2011, personal communications).  
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The Broadcasting Council is an additional important external body. Its primary function 
is to hear audience concerns regarding programming and relate those concerns to NRK; 
however, it has no compliance enforcement authority over NRK. The Council consists 
of 14 members, with eight appointed by the Storting (parliament), according to party 
strength (Thorbjornsrud and Beyer 2010) and six appointed by the ruling government. 
Council members serve four-year terms. 
NRK’s governing board, known as The Board, consists of nine members, six of whom 
(including the chair and vice-chair) are appointed or reappointed on an annual basis 
by the Ministry of Culture. The remaining three members are NRK employees who are 
elected by their peers for two year terms. Programming and administration are controlled 
by a director-general, who is appointed by The Board and serves a 6-year term, with the 
possibility of serving one additional term of the same length (NRK 2010b; Noam 1991). 
Transition to the Internet
NRK presents itself as a content provider, treating the Internet as a “new interactive 
medium” and not simply an extension of broadcast programming (Moe 2008). 
Downloadable services containing public service material are free of commercial 
advertising (NRK 2010b). NRK has received substantial government support to expand 
online, prompting complaints of unfair competition from commercial competitors TV2 
and TVNorge (Roppen 2008).  In response, NRK’s Board made the decision recently to 
cease use of advertisements online. No regulations mandated this development, so the 
Board is in theory free to reverse its decision (Thorbjornsrud and Beyer 2010, personal 
communication). 
Newspaper subsidies
Direct subsidies were established in 1969 by a center-conservative government to 
help support the “number two” newspapers in markets with local competition, small 
local newspapers, and national political newspapers representing diverse ideological 
perspectives (Østbye 2010; Østeraas 2006: 83; Murschetz 1998: 293). To be eligible, 
newspapers have to have a “general news profile” (not be a specialized publication); 
the editor has to adhere to the code of ethics established by the editors’ and publishers 
association; no dividends can be paid to the owners; and the profits cannot exceed a 
certain amount ($280,000 in 2006) (Østeraas 2006: 82-83). Subsidies are coordinated 
by the same agency that oversees broadcasting, the Norwegian Media Authority 
(Medietilsynet), and amounted to $45.8 million (€36 million) in 2006, or 2 percent of 
total press revenues.
Of the nation’s 220 (non-free) newspapers, 157 received direct subsidies (Østeraas 2006: 
81-82; Østbye 2010). According to Bjorn Tore Østeraas (2006: 81-82) of Medietilsynet, 
newspapers “will receive the subsidy according to the criteria, no matter what [they] print.” 
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Østeraas illustrated this principle with the recent incident of a Norwegian newspaper that 
printed a “rather infamous cartoon of Muhammad” and which had applied for a subsidy 
the following year, saying: “there is no way that you can exclude that newspaper” from 
receiving the subsidy (ibid.: 81). As in many European countries, all newspapers receive 
indirect subsidies: in Norway, these take the form of an exemption from the VAT sales tax, 
valued at $194 million (€160 million in 2005) (Østeraas 2006: 82).
Why It Matters: News Content and Public Knowledge 
Content analysis (Lund and Berg 2009) finds that the NRK offers significantly more 
original news programming as a percentage of all program content (18.4 percent) in 
comparison to its commercial competitors TV2 (10.1 percent) and TV Norge (3 percent). 
In the time since this study, TV Norge has ceased to broadcast news entirely. 
In the most recent parliamentary election cycle, NRK’s program VELG!09 was the most 
watched election news coverage program in the country (NRK Annual Report 2009: 
79). More generally, NRK is well known for both critical documentaries as well as tough 
questioning of politicians (its program Question Time brings parliamentarians together to 
discuss issues of public importance), particularly during election periods (NRK Annual 
Report 2009; Thorbjornsrud and Beyer 2010, personal communication). 
In 2008, NRK 1 aired Fight for the Winter Games, the first film in a documentary series 
entitled Behind Closed Doors. The film examined the fight between Oslo, Trondheim and 
Tromso for the Winter Olympics in 2018, subjecting the relationship between the Tromso 
2018 committee, government, and opposition politicians to critical scrutiny. The film’s 
intent was to investigate lobbying activities in Norway. Other films in the series examined 
Norway’s procurement of 48 fighter jets and the battle over outstanding taxes owed to 
the Norwegian government. The series sought to provide a behind-the-scenes look into 
procedures of government, offering citizens a sense of involvement not normally extended 
to the public.
When Norwegian researcher Erling Sivertsen (cited in Skogerbø 1997: 111) directly 
compared subsidized and non-subsidized newspapers in Norway, he found “journalists 
working in subsidized newspapers produce far more original news stories than journalists 
in non-subsidized newspapers.” Another researcher, Helge Østbye, concluded that “the 
process of monopolization [in the newspaper sector] has been substantially curbed as a 
result of press subsidies.”16 
16 Helge Østbye (2002), “Relations Between State and Press in Norway,” in Odin, Norwegian Ministry of Affairs, cited 
in Dennis (2004: 16). 
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SWEDEN
Overview
Sweden’s public television17 broadcaster SVT runs two primary channels, SVT 1 (20 percent 
audience share) and SVT 2 (10 percent), as well as a few niche channels (children’s and 
regional programming), which altogether command 34 percent of the Swedish daily 
audience. The major private competitor is TV4 (owned by the Bonnier group), with about 
20 percent of the audience share, followed at a distance by TV 3 and TV 6 (both of the 
Modern Times Group) and Kanal 5 (of ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG).
Funding
SVT’s total revenues in 2008 were $573.6 million (€363.6 million). Almost all (93 
percent) of that funding comes from the license fee, with the remaining portion generated 
through program sales and sponsorships of sporting events. The license fee is set every 
three years by parliament based on a variety of inputs, including: annual reports provided 
by SVT, reports from academic experts on the needs of public broadcasters, and joint 
parliamentary working groups that work under E.U. regulations to ensure the broadcaster 
receives adequate, though not disproportionate, funding (Hulten 2003). In 2009, the 
license fee was $287 (2,076 Kronor) (SVT 2010). 
Protections of Autonomy and Accountability
SVT operates by law according to a section in the Radio and Television Law called the 
“Charter for Television Broadcasting Services in Sweden.” Known as the Charter, this 
document states that SVT must “provide terrestrially transmitted television services in the 
service of the public” and that these services need to be “carried out independently in 
relation to the state, organized interest groups and other influential groups and bodies” 
(SVT 2010). The Charter must be renewed every three years (Nakamura 2009).18
External regulatory oversight is conducted by the Swedish Radio and TV Authority, which 
reports to the Ministry of Culture. It is headed by a director-general, who is appointed by 
the government in power. Scholars have noted that Swedish regulators tend to broadly 
reflect the political balance among parties in parliament (Humphreys 1996: 156; Hallin 
and Mancini 2004: 169; Hessérus 2010, personal communication). The Authority 
includes a Complaints Commission, which citizens can contact if they feel public or 
private television programs have breached ethical standards (Örnebring 2010, personal 
communication).
17  Sweden has three separate institutions that direct public broadcasting: SVT for television, SR for radio, and UR, 
which produces educational programs. All three are overseen by an independent foundation, and UR receives the 
smallest portion of funds (5 percent of all funding in 2005) (Nordic PSB 2005). 
18  Previously, it lasted for six years. The change occurred in 2006 with the arrival of a new conservative government 
to power. 
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SVT is legally controlled by an independent foundation, Förvaltningsstiftelsen för Sveriges 
Radio AB, established in 1997. Prior to setting up the foundation, the public broadcasters 
were owned by various social groups and news media organizations. Foundation 
ownership was established as a means of creating a buffer between the state and market 
(Management Foundation 2010). The foundation’s board consists of 13 members, 
including the chair, who serves four years; other members’ terms last eight years. Terms 
are staggered so that half the board, including the chair, leaves every four years, while 
the other half remains. Parliament begins the process with each party recommending 
members (based on party affiliation but also expertise in the areas of media, law, business 
and the arts). The ruling government then makes appointments from this list. As of 2007, 
all parties in parliament must be represented on the board (Management Foundation 
2010). The foundation has no legal authority to intervene in programming decisions and is 
responsible for the financial direction of SVT. 
Transition to the Internet 
SVT has expanded its online offerings incrementally and the basic funding model — no 
advertising accepted — has been maintained. Public discussions about the possibility of 
accepting advertising produced widespread criticism, thus confirming the basic values of 
the public service mission (Roppen et al. 2006).
Newspaper subsidies
Sweden’s Freedom of the Press Act of 1766 was the first constitutional law of its kind in 
the world to guard press freedom (Weibull 2003: 89), and, historically, as in the rest of 
Scandinavia, Swedish newspaper readership rates have been among the highest in the 
world. Newspaper subsidies were first proposed in the 1960s in response to a decline in 
the number of newspapers, especially “secondary” dailies that were “losing out in the 
commercial contest for advertising” because of their weaker market position. According 
to the principle set out by a 1972 press commission, these “operational” (Karlsson 2006: 
100) subsidies are based on “automatic rules, with no special concern for individual 
papers” and “no conditions for reporting” (i.e. content-neutral): support was accorded 
on a formulaic basis to newspapers of “newspaper character (i.e. general or political 
news, “with more than half of the material … their own editorial material”; see Karlsson 
2006: 101), published at least once a week, being mainly subscribed, and having at least 
2,000 subscribers,” whose household coverage in a given market does not exceed 40 
percent (Weibull 2003: 100, 104; see also Murschetz 1998: 294-295). In addition, some 
small regional monopoly newspapers and “special newspapers of religious and cultural 
significance” have received support (Murschetz 1998: 294-295; Weibull 2003). 
Total operational subsidies amounted to $56.9 million (€47 million) in 2005, spread 
among 74 of Sweden’s 168 newspapers (of which 24 actually appear three to seven times 
per week, and 50 are published one or two times per week). These subsidies represent 
about 3 percent of total Swedish press revenues, though for some newspapers they make 
up a much more substantial percentage (Weibull and Jönsson 2010). Historically, Swedish 
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newspaper subsidies have been “funded through a levy of 10 percent on all advertising 
except that for newspaper advertising which is set at 3 percent” (Dennis 2004: 12); this tax 
“has so far covered the costs of the subsidy system and generated a surplus for the state” 
(Gustafsson, Örnebring, and Levy 2010: 8). Although most subsidies are automatic based 
on the criteria noted above, a Press Subsidies Council oversees the process. This Council 
consists of 10 members, seven nominated by political parties in the parliament, and is 
presided over by a senior legal official (in recent years a Supreme Court Justice) (Karlsson 
2006: 99).
 
Economic cooperation (in administration or advertising) among newspapers in the same 
market is also encouraged by a program similar to the U.S. Joint Operation Agreement 
(JOA) model (Weibull 2003: 97). In the past, two-year loans exempt from interest and 
free of amortization were offered to “new market entrants” as a way to promote “editorial 
diversity.” During the 20 years that the program was in effect in Sweden, 25 new titles were 
launched (Murschetz 1998: 294, 310 fn 6). More recently, the circulation threshold for 
receiving subsidies was lowered from 2,000 to 1,500 to “stimulate new newspapers to start 
up to increase diversity” (Karlsson 2006: 101). In addition, all newspapers benefit from a 
distribution subsidy and a reduction in the VAT sales tax (Karlsson 2006: 100). 
Subsidy programs are now being adapted to help online newspapers as well: In 2007, “the 
online-only newspaper Politiken.se was deemed eligible for a (reduced) production support 
(55 percent of the full subsidy) as a weekly newspaper” (Gustafsson, Örnebring, and Levy 
2010: 21).
Why It Matters: News Content and Public Knowledge
SVT and local paid-for newspapers, both of which receive significant public aid, are the 
most trusted news media in Sweden, accorded “high trust” by 72 and 62 percent of the 
public, respectively (reported in Gustafsson, Örnebring, and Levy 2010: 12). 
Existing scholarship demonstrates that SVT produces significant amounts of news, 
cultural, and children’s programming, especially relative to commercial competitors. 
Shows like Uppdrag granskning (Mission: Investigation) are well known for exploring 
political malfeasance at both the local and national levels (Hessérus 2010, personal 
communication). Lund and Berg (2009) find news programming to account for 34 
percent of all SVT programming, while constituting only 10 percent of program time for 
commercial broadcasters. An earlier study by McKinsey & Co. (1999) suggests that even 
this relatively small amount of news on commercial broadcasts was prompted by the 
existence of SVT’s news programming. 
Media researchers Jesper Strömbäck and Daniela Dimitrova (2006) compared Swedish 
and U.S. news coverage of elections and found that whereas the U.S. coverage tended to 
focus on the “horse race” and political strategies, the coverage of publicly funded Swedish 
newspapers tended to be more “issue-oriented, providing more interpretive reporting.” 
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Ekström, Johansson and Larsson (2006) looked at Swedish news reporting of local politics 
over time and found that coverage actually became more critical beginning in the 1970s, 
around the time that government subsidies were enacted.
However, another Swedish study (Nord and Nygren 2002) chides the Swedish local 
press  in recent years for being “too decent,” that is, for not being critical enough of local 
politicians and political parties, and for “factually and faithfully reporting statements made 
by local politicians … [rather] than questioning them” (cited in Gustafsson, Örnebring, 
and Levy 2010: 18). The Swedish authors of this study however did not call for ending 
subsidies; in fact, one of the authors called for increasing subsidies to local newspapers in 
some regions as well as encouraging more “critical self-examination by journalists” and 
new “editorial priorities” (ibid.: 19).    
Subsidies have not entirely prevented the continued loss of many newspapers. However, 
Leonard Weibull (2003: 105), a leading Swedish scholar of subsidies, concludes that 
they successfully “stimulated pluralism in the press”; since the 1970s, this pluralism 
has become less tied to partisan political newspapers and more to a rising culture of 
journalistic “critical surveillance,” the importance of which was acknowledged by a 1990s 
press commission report (ibid.: 105). Media scholars Gustafsson, Örnebring, and Levy 
(2010: 20-21) concur that “press subsidies have largely achieved their goal of maintaining 
structural diversity at a relatively moderate cost”; they estimate that abolishing the current 
subsidies would “lead to the immediate closure of 50-60 newspapers.” 
Press subsidies have not only prevented newspapers from dying, they have also in some 
cases “made market entry easier: there is at least one example of a newspaper that began 
as a weekly paper in 2002 and was then able to increase its publication frequency to three 
issues per week thanks to the subsidy system” (Gustafsson, Örnebring, and Levy 2010: 20). 
UNITED KINGDOM
Overview
The country’s public broadcaster, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which now 
includes several channels, is both the oldest and most watched media outlet in the nation. 
Founded in 1922, its 2008 portion of the audience share was 38 percent of all viewers. 
Following the BBC in audience reach is ITV, the oldest commercial television broadcaster 
in the country launched in 1955, also now including several portfolio channels; ITV’s 2008 
share of the audience was 23 percent. While publicly owned, Channel 4 (and its portfolio 
of sister channels) is funded largely through commercial revenues and draws 12 percent 
of the audience share. (While Channel 4 is technically part of the U.K.’s public service 
broadcasting sector, the focus here will be on BBC.) Relatively more recent media outlets 
in the television field are Sky (a satellite service, est. 1990) and Five (a free-to-air channel 
like BBC or ITV, est. 1997), each accounting for about 6 percent of audience share.19 
19  Audience share data from both Ofcom (2010) and European Audiovisual Observatory (2009).  Historical accounts 
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Funding
In 2009, BBC revenues totaled $7.2 billion (£4.8 billion), of which 72 percent is drawn 
from the license fee.  The remaining amount is primarily generated by the BBC’s foreign 
services through a combination of direct grants from the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (6 percent) and commercial revenues  (22 percent) raised by BBC Worldwide, 
the for-profit arm of the BBC that operates internationally, through a combination of 
licensing, advertising and provisioning of services (BBC Strategy Review 2010).  
As of April 1, 2010, the annual license fee was $224 per household (£146). In negotiation 
with the BBC, the Department of Culture, Media and Sport sets the terms of the fee for a 
six-year period. In the current period, it is set to rise from £136 in 2007 to £152 in 2012. 
The fee is collected by the BBC, as required under the terms of the 2003 Communications 
Act. Upon collection, funds are placed in a central government Consolidated Fund and 
then voted on by Parliament in the annual Appropriation Act as part of the Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport’s budget. Tunstall (2010: 150) notes the favorable position of the 
BBC relative to commercial broadcasters following the 2008 crisis: “As with other ‘funding 
crises’ in the past, the two systems (BBC and commercial) were diverging rapidly in terms 
of financial prospects. ITV, and Channels 4 and Five, all faced massive drops in funding 
and new difficulties in meeting their (modest) public service obligations. By contrast, the 
BBC had been awarded a relatively favorable (and slowly rising) license fee from 2007 to 
April 2013.” 
Protections of Autonomy and Accountability
The constitutional basis for the BBC is the Royal Charter, which guarantees its legal 
existence for at least 10-15 years. BBC’s “independent status” is thus rooted in the fact 
that it was originally “established by the crown and not by parliament, which means it 
is constitutionally separated from the government” (van Dijk, Nahuis, and Waagmeester 
2006: 4). The most recent charter renewals were in 1981, 1996 and 2006. The current 
charter will expire in 2016.20  
The BBC’s mandate as set forth in the Royal Charter (2006 version) stipulates that it 
must be involved in several functions: “(a) sustaining citizenship and civil society; (b) 
promoting education and learning; (c) stimulating creativity and cultural excellence; 
(d) representing the U.K., its nations, regions and communities; (e) bringing the U.K. to 
the world and the world to the U.K.; (f) … helping to deliver to the public the benefit of 
emerging communications technologies and services” (BBC Strategy Review 2010). 
of the BBC can be found in Briggs (1979, 1985) and Born (2004). Humphreys (1996) discusses the emergence of both 
ITV and Channel 4. Regarding Sky and Channel 5, see King (1998) and Smith (2006).  
20  The Royal Charter can be found in full at the BBC website: http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/about/
how_we_govern/charter.pdf. For commentary on the importance of the charter in assuring the corporation’s stabil-
ity over time, see Tunstall (2010).  
 56
PUBLIC MEDIA AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE: Lessons for the Future of Journalism from Around the World
The BBC Trust (replacing the Board of Governors as of 2007) legally controls the 
corporation. The Queen, on advice from government ministers and an independent 
commissioner for public appointments, appoints its 12 trustees, including one 
chairperson, a vice-chairperson and 10 “ordinary members.” Of those 10 ordinary 
members, four must be designated as representatives of England, Scotland, Wales or 
Northern Ireland, respectively. Trustees can serve up to two five-year terms.21 In Briggs’ 
(1979: 32-34) history of the BBC’s first 50 years, he found that trustees (then called 
governors) typically included former politicians, finance and business leaders, ex-
diplomats, social service or trade union leaders, authors, journalists and retired military 
officers. A review of the biographies and backgrounds of the most recent trustees suggest 
that, roughly speaking, this general mixture remains to the present day.22 Transparency of 
trustee decision-making is furthered by publication on the BBC website of a “register of 
interests,” including detailed information about investments of trustees and their family 
members, paid or voluntary positions, expense reports, gifts or other benefits received 
during their terms of office, and procedures for handling potential conflicts of interest.23  
According to the 2006 Royal Charter, the Trust is the guardian of both the finances and 
public interest of the BBC. It grants five-year licenses for individual BBC services and 
channels to the Executive Board, which oversees the day-to-day operational management 
of the corporation.24 These licenses set out the objectives and characteristics of new 
services, specify the benefits to license fee payers (i.e., the public) and set the required 
budget for the service’s provision (Born 2004; Bron 2010). To either introduce a new 
service or substantially modify an existing one, the Executive Board must submit to 
the Trust a detailed proposal, oftentimes followed by a public value test (PVT). Begun 
in 2007, the PVT is a procedure25 designed to ascertain whether new services are in the 
public interest26 and requires taking into account several criteria, as specified in the BBC 
Agreement with the Department of Culture, Media and Sport: impact (e.g. the extent 
21  Terms are not staggered, though reappointments are common, thus ensuring continuity between some ele-
ments of the Trust who remain while others leave. In June 2009, there was some discussion and speculation about 
‘too many’ Trust members’ terms ending (eight total at the time), though several were in fact reappointed (Brown 
and Conlan 2009).
22  See http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/about/who_we_are/trustees/index.shtml
23  http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/about/who_we_are/trustees/register_of_interests.shtml
24  There are 10 positions on the executive board, including that of Director-General, Deputy Director General, Chief 
Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Director of Marketing, Director of Vision, Director of Future Media, Director 
of Audio & Music, Director of BBC North, Director of BBC People. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/running/
executive/
25  The PVT is carried out by the Trust Unit, an advisory group to the BBC Trust. In the Royal Charter, the Trust is given 
legal authority to appoint and remunerate such advisory groups. 
26  Public interest is invoked throughout the regulatory documentation for the BBC. In fact, the mission of the BBC 
in the most recent Royal Charter is to “serve the public interest.” A definition of public interest is not provided. A BBC 
commissioned report (Morrison and Svennevig 2002: 7) found that “regulators, media personnel, trade associations 
and others…do not have a precise definition of the public interest.”  They suggest that the definitional ambiguity 
is functional as it permits “post hoc defense of practices where no public interest is obvious” (p. 7). In the specific 
context of PVTs, the public interest can be understood to be operationalized as providing high value for license fee 
payers (the public) in a way that does not negatively impact user experience (Bron 2010). One point by Born (2004) 
is that these sorts of tests are about enacting financial oversight over the BBC and assessing the effects of new 
services on commercial competitors. 
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to which a new service will affect relevant users), cost (the financial implications of the 
change), novelty (the extent to which the change would involve the BBC in a new area of 
activity), and duration (i.e. how long the service ought to last).
After this test, the regulatory agency Ofcom27 (see below) assesses the impact on 
innovation and investment by other commercial sector media providers against the public 
value delivered before approving the new services (OECD 2009: 75). Though relatively 
recent, the BBC has received negative decisions on new services, most notably a 2008 
proposal to provide additional local video news, sports and weather services in 60 areas 
of the U.K. on local BBC news sites. The project was to have required 400 staff and a 
total budget of $104.8 million. It was rejected by the Trust before reaching Ofcom on 
the grounds that the service would not be the best use of the license fee funds and might 
negatively impact commercial media at the local level (Prosser 2009). 
Ofcom (Office of Communications, the British equivalent of the U.S. Federal 
Communications Commission) has only limited oversight of the BBC, as was 
stressed to the authors by leading British scholars (Blumler, Freedman 2010, personal 
communications). As Negrine (2007: 93) clarifies, “The BBC Governors [now known 
as trustees] retain powers and responsibilities over the governance of the BBC and such 
matters as editorial policy. In this respect, the governance of the BBC remains within the 
hands of the [trustees]. Ofcom nevertheless does have some regulatory powers. … The BBC 
needs to consult or seek guidance from Ofcom over matters such as programming policy.” 
In addition, Ofcom conducts performance reviews, based in part on responses of viewers, 
of all of the U.K. public service broadcasters including BBC, that “feed into Government’s 
review of the BBC’s Charter” (ibid.: 93). 
Neither the internal (BBC Trust) or external (Ofcom or the Department of Media, Culture 
and Sport) authorities have the legal capacity to preview specific content prior to its airing 
(Bron 2010). Ofcom does, however, annually monitor compliance with program quality 
standards across the entire field of broadcasting. Following the 2003 Communications 
Act, these are defined as: dealing with a wide range of subjects, catering to the widest 
possible range of audiences across different times of the day and through different types of 
programming, and maintaining high standards of production (Communications Act 2003, 
clause 264; Ofcom 2010). In the most recent evaluation, Ofcom found the BBC to deliver 
high quality, original programming that is made widely available. They did, however, find 
spending on regional programming to decline by 32 percent from 2005 to 2009. While 
total output of such programming did meet public service quotas, the commission’s report 
nonetheless signaled the decline as a concern (see Ofcom 2010).
27  Ofcom’s role is stipulated in Article 30 of the BBC Agreement. 
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As noted, the BBC is operated on a daily basis by the Executive Board, led by the Director-
General. In the past, Directors-General almost always came from within the BBC, though 
this pattern changed in the 1990s as two directors—John Birt and Greg Dyke—had careers 
in commercial television. The current Director-General, Mark Thompson, has worked at 
the BBC since 1979. 
It is not legally possible for the political party in power to directly remove the Director-
General, though since the input of government ministers is required for the appointment 
of trustees,28 there is some potential of indirect political interference. One prominent 
example of this happening occurred in the 1980s when Director-General Alasdair Milne 
was forced to resign by the Trust (then known as the Board of Governors) following 
pressure from the Thatcher administration, which claimed a general BBC left-wing bias 
and was specifically aggravated about coverage of the Falklands War. In 2004, Director-
General Greg Dyke resigned amidst controversy regarding BBC reporting of British 
involvement in claims about weapons of mass destruction in the lead-up to the Iraq 
War. The controversy did not concern the factual nature of the reporting, but rather the 
subsequent suicide of an employee at the Ministry of Defense after being named as a 
source in BBC reports that the Labor government of Tony Blair had “sexed up” the case for 
war. In a review of these developments, Barnett (2005: 338) notes that there continues to 
exist a “deeply rooted journalistic culture within the BBC that places enormous value on 
impartiality, professionalism and above all independence.” 
David Levy (2010: 3), director of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at the 
University of Oxford, estimates that the ultimate outcome of the forced resignation of 
Dyke was a reinforcement of BBC’s independence: “There was a sense in the public and 
press that while the BBC’s journalism and governance processes may have been imperfect, 
the bigger fear threat was from a government that had overreached itself and could 
threaten the BBC’s independence. The government was therefore extremely keen to present 
itself as respecting that independence during the Charter Review [of 2006].” All in all, Levy 
judges the new Charter a “surprisingly good settlement for the BBC” (ibid.: 7).  
Audience councils constitute an additional mechanism to ensure BBC’s public 
accountability. Established by the most recent Royal Charter (2006: 15), these councils 
(there are four, one for each of the four U.K. nations) are required to be “consulted on the 
BBC’s performance in promoting [its] public purposes.” The councils are required in turn 
to publish an annual report assessing how well the BBC met the needs of its license payers. 
These are unpaid, volunteer positions. 
Scholars have also noted that the BBC has managed to achieve professional autonomy 
(from government intervention) as much through informal public support as through the 
above outlined forms of oversight. Tunstall (2010: 149) writes that “although many British 
28  Trustees are not replaced with the election of a new government. They fill out their terms. As noted above, these 
are five years long and can be renewed once for a total of 10 years’ service. 
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politicians have tried to steer the BBC in particular partisan directions, most such attempts 
have been somewhat hesitant and of limited success. Both the relevant politicians and the 
relevant senior civil servants recognize the BBC usually scores more highly in opinion polls 
than does the incumbent government.”
Transition to the Internet
The BBC was an early adopter of online services, developing websites as early as 1994 and 
fully launching BBC Online in 1997 (Humphreys 2010). A 2005 review of online services 
by one think tank drew the following conclusion: “No other European broadcaster can 
boast the range and depth of BBC’s online activities or range of niche channels” (Open 
Society Institute 2005: 336). 
In large part due to the BBC’s exceptional online popularity and success, commercial 
competitors in the U.K. have claimed that the BBC engages in unfair competition under 
E.U. law (Brevini 2010; Humphreys 2010). In the lead-up to the most recent charter 
renewal in 2006, these concerns became especially vocal. As a response, “public value 
tests” were introduced. This procedure (detailed above) requires the BBC to assess the 
market impact of any new service against the public value created through it (OECD 
2009). As a result of these tests, several existing BBC niche sites have been shuttered 
(Brevini 2010). One of the most recent white papers from the government suggests 
a continuation of such trends, claiming that “given the current nature of the market, 
new BBC activity has a higher risk than in the past of chilling or foreclosing market 
developments” (Department of Culture, Media and Sport 2009: 140). In response to 
this paper, a recent BBC Strategy Review discussed the possibility of a 25 percent budget 
reduction for online projects in 2013 (BBC Strategy Review 2010: 9). 
Despite these concerns, surveys continue to show bbc.co.uk to be highly valued by the 
public. Its release in 2008 of an online seven-day “catch up” service called iPlayer was 
roundly deemed a success, with download requests increasing at a rate of 20 percent month 
over month and, within five months, attracting 750,000 download requests daily. The 
player is provided free to all U.K. license-fee payers (Bulkley 2008; Humphreys 2010). 
Why It Matters: News Content and Public Knowledge
A variety of studies from the 1980s to the present day conclude that BBC provides 
more original news programs and a greater diversity of programming of all types than 
commercial broadcasters. Blumler et al. (1985: 348-349) compared major broadcasting 
systems in Western Europe and the United States and found that the range of programs 
offered (news, original television series, minority programming, etc.) was most extensive 
at the BBC, especially in comparison to the United States, where all three commercial 
networks tended to broadcast the same types of programs at the same times. This led the 
authors to conclude: “This evidence suggests that broadcasting systems which are most 
dependent on advertising also schedule the narrowest range of programming” (ibid.:  351). 
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This finding is echoed by the research of Goddard et al. (2007) who recount the demise of 
World in Action, an investigative journalism program on the commercial ITV network from 
1963-1998 that was ultimately cancelled primarily due to commercial (lack of advertising 
and high cost of production) rather than journalistic reasons. 
More recently, Curran et al. (2009) compared British and U.S. television and found 
that public service television devotes more attention than commercial outlets to public 
affairs and international news while also fostering greater knowledge in these areas than 
market-driven broadcasters. Whereas only 34 percent of low educated persons in the U.S. 
watch national television news more than four times a week, 75 percent of similarly low 
educated persons do so in the U.K.; likewise, whereas only 30 percent of low-income 
persons watch national news in the United States, 69 percent do so in the U.K.29 Lastly, 
whereas only 35 percent of ethnic minorities (defined as non-white in both the U.S. and 
U.K.) watch evening news in the U.S., 73 percent watch the evening news in the U.K. 
(ibid.: 20). These findings corroborate with those of a study across E.U. nations, which 
found that citizens who report preference for public over commercial television programs 
tend to be more informed (Holtz-Bacha and Norris 2001). 
Additional research suggests the BBC increases the general national diversity of 
programming across all broadcasters, public and commercial. A McKinsey & Co. (1999: 4) 
report notes that due to its unique funding method and public service role, the BBC is able 
to popularize new styles of programming, and in doing so exert pressure on commercial 
competitors to follow suit. An example: the BBC spent large amounts of both time and 
money in producing “costume-rated dramas” (e.g. period pieces) like Pride and Prejudice. 
The competing commercial channels, rather than concede the genre to the BBC, created 
their own high-quality dramas in response. “The competition among the … broadcasters 
raises quality and reinforces taste for the genre.” 
Though the BBC is often lauded for its national news services, since the early 1990s it has 
also aimed at strengthening and reinventing its news-based identity in local radio markets 
with a specific focus on including ethnic minorities. As Lang (2004: 160) notes: “The BBC 
has … introduced formats such as ‘talk shows’ and ‘studio debates’ that engage citizens in 
meaningful complex discussions about their communities.” In terms of both the quality 
of discussion and the level of community participation, she suggests these formats to be 
“models for devising community-oriented participation venues with less inflammatory 
content than found on American talk radio.” 
29  In the United States, individuals with incomes below $24,999 are considered low-income. In the United Kingdom, 
individuals with incomes below £19,999 are similarly considered low income. 
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PART III: TABLES
Table 1: Funding Public Media in the U.S. and 14 Leading Democracies  
(figures in U.S. Dollars)1
Country Year Public Funding(millions)
Non-Public  
Funding2
(millions)
Total  
Revenue
(millions)
Per 
Capita3 
Public  
Funding
Per Capita 
Total  
Revenue
Australia (ABC) 2008 728.9 (82.3%) 157.0 (17.7%) 885.9 34.01 41.34
Belgium (VRT/RTBF) 2008 805.1 (77.8%) 229.8 (22.2%) 1,034.9 74.62 95.92
Canada (CBC) 2008 1,013.3 (63.6%) 579.7 (36.4%) 1,593.0 30.42 47.83
Denmark (DR) 2008 717.0 (91.0%) 70.9 (9.0%) 787.9 130.52 143.42
Finland (YLE) 2007 526.0 (95.0%) 27.7 (5.0%) 553.7 99.00 104.21
France4 (F2/F3) 2008 3,211.1 (74.0%) 1,128.2 (26.0%) 4,339.3 51.56 69.68
Germany (ARD/ZDF) 2008 10,778.5 (86.2%) 1,721.5 (13.8%) 12,500.0 131.27 152.23
Ireland (RTE) 2008 317.1 (45.6%) 378.3 (54.4%) 695.4 71.65 157.13
Japan (NHK) 2009  6,900.0 (100%) --- 6,900.0 54.03 54.03
Netherlands (NPO) 2007 822.3 (68.0%) 386.9 (32.0%) 1,209.2 50.00 73.53
New Zealand  
(TVNZ/NZoA)
2008 126.5 (38.5%) 202.4 (61.5%) 328.9 29.63 77.05
Norway (NRK) 2007 636.9 (95.0%) 33.6 (5.0%) 670.5 133.57 140.62
Sweden (SVT) 2008 533.5 (93.0%) 40.1 (7.0%) 573.6 57.87 62.22
United Kingdom 
(BBC)
2009 5,608.8 (77.9%)5 1,593.4 (22.1%) 7,202.2 90.70 116.43
United States  
(PBS/NPR)
2008 1,139.3 (40.0%)6 1,710.0 (60.0%) 2,849.3 3.75 9.37
Sources: For Europe, 2009 Yearbook of the European Audiovisual Observatory. For Australia, ABC Annual report 2009; for Canada, CBC Annual Report 
2009; for Japan, NHK Annual Report 2010-2011; for New Zealand, New Zealand Annual TV Report and New Zealand on the Air Annual Report, 2009; 
for United States, Corporation for Public Broadcasting 2008 Annual Report. 
1  All currency exchanges have been calculated using Oanda Currency Converter on July 1 for the relevant year. 
2 Non-public funding includes licensing fees, sponsorships, program sales, as well as advertising in those countries that allow it. U.S. figure includes 
business sponsorships, foundation grants, and subscriptions.
3 Per capita calculated by dividing total funds by total population as reported by the World Bank (2010): World Bank Development Indicators. URL: 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
4  Figure represents both France Télévisions and France Radio.
5  Figure represents both license fee and government grants.
6  Figure includes federal, state, and local government funding.
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Table 2: Types of Funding and Firewalls in 14 Leading Democracies
Country FundingSources*
Funding  
decision-makers
Funding 
renewal Administrative Buffers Legal protection
Australia
(ABC)
DG, A • Federal 
government
• Parliament
• Budget 
approved for 
three-year 
periods
• ABC Board: 8 members; 
7 appointed by the 
Governor-General on 
recommendation of 
ruling government
• Managing director 
appointed by the board
• Australian Broadcasting 
Act sets forth protocols 
to ensure editorial 
independence
Belgium 
(VRT/
RTBF)
DG, A • Contract estab. 
between VRT/
RTBF and ruling 
govt.
• Every 5 years 
through 
estab. of new 
contracts
• Vlaame Regulator 
voor de Media (VRM): 
Flemish-lang. regulatory 
authority
• Conseil Superieur de 
l’Audiovisuel (CSA): 
French-lang. regulatory 
authority
• Sector Council for the 
Media
• Board of Governors: 
12-members, 5-year 
terms, appointed by 
ruling government
• Management Contract 
sets forth funding levels 
and ties those levels to 
performance criteria
• VRM and CSA have 
no legal authority 
to intervene in 
programming decisions
Canada
(CBC)
DG, A, OC • Ministry  of 
Heritage (MH)
• Parliament
• Annual 
amount 
proposed by 
MH
• Annual 
approval by 
Parliament
• Canadian Radio-
Television and 
Telecomm. Commission 
(CRTC): 12 members with 
5-year staggered terms 
appointed by Prime 
Minister
• CBC Board of Directors: 
12 members, 5-year 
terms, appointed by 
Prime Minister
• Broadcasting Act of 1991
• CRTC has no power to 
censor programs
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Country FundingSources*
Funding  
decision-makers
Funding 
renewal Administrative Buffers Legal protection
Denmark
(DR)
LF • Ministry of 
Culture
• Parliament
• LF set every 
four years
• Radio and Television 
Board (RTB): 8 members 
with diverse professional 
backgrounds, 7 
appointed by the 
Ministry of Culture, 1 by 
the Cooperative Forum 
for Danish Listeners and 
Viewers Association; 
oversees both public and 
private media
• DR Executive Board: 11 
members, 4-year terms; 
Ministry of Culture 
appoints 3 (including 
Chairman), Parliament 
appoints 6 (proportional 
to party strength), DR 
employees appoint 2
• Radio and Television Act
• Contract (set every 4 
years and agreed upon 
by DR and the Ministry of 
Culture)
Finland
(YLE)
LF • Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications
• LF set 
annually 
• FICORA (Finnish 
Communications 
Regulatory Authority): 
director-general 
appointed by Ministry 
of Transport and 
Communication; 
director-general 
appoints other 7 
members of Board of 
Directors
• YLE Administrative 
Council: 21 members 
with diverse professional 
and social backgrounds, 
elected by Parliament 
(proportional to party 
strength); 2 additional 
non-voting members 
elected by YLE staff
• YLE Board of Directors: 
5-8 members with 
diverse expertise, 
elected annually 
by Administrative 
Council (who may not 
be members of the 
Adm. Council nor YLE 
employees); decides 
budget and appoints 
managing director
• FICORA has no legal 
authority to intervene in 
programming decisions 
prior to broadcast
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Country FundingSources*
Funding  
decision-makers
Funding 
renewal Administrative Buffers Legal protection
France  
(F2/F3)
LF, A • Ministry of 
Culture and 
Communication 
• Ministry of 
Finance
• Prime Minister
• National 
Assembly and 
Senate
• LF set 
annually 
• Conseil superieur de 
l’audiovisuel (CSA): 
9 commissioners, 3 
appointed by President, 
3 appointed by 
Senate President, 3 by 
President of the National 
Assembly; staggered 
6-year terms
• Administrative Board: 14 
members, 5-year terms; 
includes 2 members of 
Parliament (one elected 
by Senate, the other by 
the National Assembly), 5 
civil servants appointed 
by ruling government, 5 
appointed by CSA, 2 by 
FTV staff
• CSA issues programming 
recommendations only 
after broadcasts and is 
not legally capable of 
censoring
Germany
(ARD 
regional/ 
ZDF)
LF, A • KEF (Commission 
for the 
Determination 
of the Financial 
Needs of 
Broadcasters)
• Lander 
parliaments
• LF set every 2 
years by KEF
• Approved 
by regional 
Lander 
parliaments, 
generally pro 
forma
• KEF: 16 members 
appointed by Premiers of 
the 16 federal states
• Broadcasting Councils 
for each channel, made 
up of individuals from 
political parties and civil 
society groups: appoint 
and advise Directors 
General
• Administrative 
councils, for financial 
oversight (appointed by 
Broadcasting Councils)
• Strong constitutional 
principle of state 
non-interference in 
broadcasting
• Central political exec. 
has no authority to set 
funding
• Lander prohibited 
from evaluating public 
service performance in 
determining funding
Ireland
(RTE)
LF, A • Broadcast. 
Authority of 
Ireland
• Ministry of 
Communications 
(MC)
• Ministry of 
Finance (MF)
• LF set 
annually 
• Broadcasting Authority 
of Ireland: 9 members, 
with 5 appointed by 
ruling government 
and 4 appointed by 
parliamentary committee
• RTE Board: 12 members, 
5-year, non-staggered 
terms (6 appointed by 
MC, 4 by Parliament 
Committee on 
communication, 1 by RTE 
staff, 1 – the Director-
General  – elected by 
Board)
• RTE Executive Board: 
6 members, including 
Director-General; in 
charge of  day-to-day 
management
• Broadcasting Act, which 
stipulates the formula to 
be used when deciding 
funding levels
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Country FundingSources*
Funding  
decision-makers
Funding 
renewal Administrative Buffers Legal protection
Japan
(NHK)
LF • Ministry 
of Internal 
Affairs and 
Communications
• The Diet 
(Parliament)
• LF set 
annually 
• Board of Governors: 12 
members, 3-year terms, 
appointed by Prime 
Minister with approval 
from The Diet
• Audit Committee: 3 
or more members, 
appointed by the Board 
of Governors
•  Broadcast Law prohibits 
political interference in 
programming decisions
Nether-
lands
(NPO)
DG, A • Ministry of 
Education, 
Culture & Science
• Parliament
• Annual 
subsidy, set 
by Ministry 
• Allocation 
among 
channels 
based on 
public 
subscriptions
• Commissariaat voor de 
Media
• Inspection Commission: 
evaluates and measures 
NPO performance every 
5 years
• STER: ensures that 
advertisers do not have 
undue influence on 
programs
• NPO Supervisory Board: 
7 members 
• NPO has discretion 
over 50 percent of 
programming in service 
of plurality, innovation, 
and professionalism 
New 
Zealand
(NZoA)
A, DG • Parliament • Annual 
budget
• NZoA Board: 6 members, 
appointed by Ministry of 
Broadcasting; oversees 
which projects receive 
funding, following 
criteria that stress 
localism and diversity of 
content
• Both the executive 
and Parliament are 
legally prohibited 
from intervening in 
New Zealand on the 
Air’s (NZoA) funding 
allocations
Norway
(NRK)
LF, A, OC • Storting 
(parliament)
• LF set 
annually 
• Norwegian Media 
Authority
• Broadcasting Council: 14 
members, 4-year terms; 
8 members elected by 
Storting, 6 by ruling 
government
• NRK Board: 9 members; 
6 annually appointed 
by Ministry of Culture, 
3 elected by NRK 
employees for 2 year 
terms; Director-General, 
appointed by Board, 
serves 6-year term
• NRK Articles of Assoc. 
specify autonomy from 
political or commercial 
interference 
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Country FundingSources*
Funding  
decision-makers
Funding 
renewal Administrative Buffers Legal protection
Sweden
(SVT)
LF, A • Parliament, based 
on input from 
SVT, academic 
experts and 
Parliamentary 
working groups
• LF set every 
three years
• Swedish Radio and TV 
Authority appointed by 
the ruling government 
with approval from 
Parliament
• Independent foundation 
Förvaltningsstiftelsen 
för Sveriges Radio AB: 
13-member Board 
with 8-year staggered 
terms appointed by 
ruling government 
after consultation with 
Parliament; Chair serves 
4-year term
• Independent foundation 
“Förvaltningsstiftel-
sen för Sveriges Radio 
AB” has no legal 
authority to intervene in  
programming decisions 
and is responsible solely 
for finances
• Charter for Television 
Broadcasting Services 
(renewed every 3 years)
United 
Kingdom 
(BBC)
LF, DG, 
OC
• Dept. of Culture, 
Media & Sport 
(DCMS) sets fee 
schedule
• Parliament 
approves
• 6 year fee 
schedule
• Annual 
approval by 
Parliament
• Office of 
Communications 
(Ofcom)
• Audience councils
• BBC Trust: 12 trustees 
appointed by Queen, 
5-year terms
• BBC Executive Board: 
appointed by the Trust
• Royal Charter (renewed 
every 10-15 yrs.)
• No pre-broadcast review 
permitted by DCMS, 
Parliament, Ofcom, or 
BBC Trust  
*Funding sources are listed in order of magnitude. LF = license fee; DG = direct government funding; A = advertising ; 0C = other commercial revenues 
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PART IV: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
UNITED KINGDOM, THE ROYAL CHARTER OF 2006 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/about/how_we_govern/charter.pdf
CANADA, BROADCASTING ACT OF 1991
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/Statute/B/B-9.01.pdf
DENMARK, RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING ACT 
OF 2010
http://kum.dk/Documents/English%20website/Media/Promulgation%20of%20the%20
Radio%20and%20Television%20Broadcasting%20Act%202010.pdf
NORWAY, NRK’S ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION
http://www.nrk.no/informasjon/about_the_nrk/1.4029867
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PART V: SOURCES OF INFORMATION
LIST OF PERSONAL E-MAIL COMMUNICATIONS
AUSTRALIA
Doyle, Waddick. Chair, Department of Global Communications, The American University 
of Paris. October 15, 2010. 
Jones, Paul. Associate Professor of Media and Cultural Sociology, University of New South 
Wales. October 14, 2010.
CANADA
CBC/Radio-Canada Liaison. August 23, 2010. 
Fremeth, Howard. Ph.D. student, School of Journalism and Communication, Carleton 
University. June 15 and June 19, 2010.  
DENMARK
Blach-Ørsten, Mark. Associate Professor, Institut for Kommunikation, Virksomhed og 
Informationsteknologier, Roskilde Universitetscenter. October 11, 2010.
Fiéve, Jette. Senior Advisor, Danish Agency for Libraries and Media. October 7, 2010. 
Hopmann, David Nicolas. Post-doctoral researcher, Political Science and Journalism, 
University of Southern Denmark. October 16, 2010. 
Jauert, Per. Lecturer, Department of Information and Media Studies, Aarhus University. 
October 11, 2010. 
Kleis Nielsen, Rasmus. Research Associate, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 
Oxford University. June 16, 2010. 
Thylstrup, Nanna. Ph.D. student, Department of Arts and Cultural Studies, University of 
Copenhagen. August 31 and September 25, 2010. 
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Willig, Ida. Associate Professor, Institut for Kommunikation, Virksomhed og 
Informationsteknologier, Roskilde Universitetscenter. October 12, 2010. 
FINLAND
Horsti, Karina. Academy of Finland Post-doctoral researcher, CEREN, University of 
Helsinki. October 5, 8, 11, 2010. 
Kunelius, Risto. Professor and Director of the Journalism Programme, University of 
Tampere. August 10, 2010. 
Lappalainen, Anne. Information Manager, Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority. 
October 8, 2010. 
FRANCE
Boudana, Sandrine. Post-doctoral researcher, Department of Media, Culture, and 
Communication, New York University. October 15, 2010.
Duval, Julian. Researcher, CNRS, Paris. October 8 and 10, 2010. 
Kuhn, Raymond. Professor and Head of Department of Politics, Queen Mary - University 
of London. October 27, 2010.
Méon, Jean-Matthieu. Assistant Professor [Maître de conférences], Information and 
Communication Sciences, CREM, Université Paul Verlaine de Metz. October 9, 2010. 
Neveu, Erik. Professor, Political Science, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Rennes. November 
7, 2010.
Sedel, Julie. Senior Lecturer, Sociology and Political Science, University of Strasbourg. 
October 14 and 16, 2010. 
GERMANY
Wegner, Horst. General Secretary of KEF. October 11, 2010. 
Wessler, Hartmut. Professor-Dr., Department of Communication, University of Mannheim. 
October 14 and 15, 2010 and January 26, 2011.
IRELAND
Kelly, Patricia. Communications and Sectoral Development Broadcasting Authority of 
Ireland. October 13, 2010. 
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JAPAN
Abe, Yasuhito. Ph.D. student, Annenberg School of Communication, University of 
Southern California. October 12, 2010. 
Krauss, Ellis. Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California, San 
Diego. October 3, 2010.  
Tateiwa, Yoi. NHK senior correspondent and Journalist-in-Residence, Investigative 
Reporting Workshop, American University School of Communication. October 12, 2010.  
THE NETHERLANDS
Magder, Ted. Associate Professor, Department of Media, Culture, and Communication, 
New York University, October 13, 2010 and January 26, 2011.
Van Vree, Frank. Professor of Journalism, Department of Media Studies, University of 
Amsterdam. October 14, 2010. 
NEW ZEALAND
Comrie, Margie. Associate Professor, School of Communication, Journalism, and 
Marketing, Massey University. October 18, 2010. 
Dunleavy, Trisha. Senior Lecturer in Media Studies, Victoria University of Wellington. 
October 14 and 18, 2010. 
Phelan, Sean. Senior Lecturer, Department of Communication, Journalism and Marketing, 
Massey University. August 24 and October 14, 2010. 
NORWAY
Thorbjornsrud, Kjersti and Audun Beyer. Research scholars, Department of 
Communication, University of Oslo. October 5, 2010 and January 20, 2011.
SWEDEN
Hessérus, Mattias. Researcher and writer, Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation, 
Stockholm. October 19, 2010.
Örnebring, Henrik. Senior Research Fellow, ERC Project on Media and Democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe, European Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, University of 
Oxford. October 14, 2010. 
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UNITED KINGDOM
Blumler, Jay. Professor Emeritus of Public Communication, Institute of Communication 
Studies, University of Leeds. August 2, 4, 6, 2010, and January 12, 2011. 
Freedman, Des. Reader in Communications and Cultural Studies, Department of Media 
and Communications, Goldsmiths-University of London. August 8, 2010, and January 12, 
2011. 
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